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**2010-2011**

1947

pp. 1534 to end

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Reference: **FO** 3371 / 61740



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1947

PALESTINE

20 FEB

Registry  
Number

E 1534/2/31

FROM

70 Minute

No.

M Bevin

Dated

Received  
in Registry18 Feb 1947  
20 Feb 1947Palestine Litigation

Gives text of Statement by Rt. Hon. E. Bevin in the House of Commons on the 18 Feb 1947. Discussing reasons for failure to reach agreement in the Palestine Question.

Last Paper.

1500

References.

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(Print.)

Eastern (Palestine)

(How disposed of.)

Ad. W. Don 1569  
Gains 385  
Bagdad 150  
Jedda 84  
Beirut 110  
Damascus 81  
Amman 66  
R.M.K.O 179

Feb 18

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(Minutes.)

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- - C.O. Tel 324 15/2  
- - - - 331 15/2  
Extract Hse of Commons 18/2  
- - - - Lords 18/2

H.73. 4/3

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

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Feb 18.

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GENERAL (PUBLIC STATEMENTS)

February 18, 1947

Section 1

E 1534/2/31

**PALESTINE: STATEMENT BY THE RIGHT HON. ERNEST BEVIN, M.P.,  
 IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON 18th FEBRUARY, 1947**

I am very sorry to have to inform the House that the conference with the Arabs and the consultations with the Zionist Organisation about the future of Palestine which have been proceeding in London have come to an end because it has become clear that there is no prospect of reaching by this means any settlement which would be even broadly acceptable to the two communities in Palestine.

Ever since they took office the Government have laboured incessantly to find a solution of the Palestine problem. Most members on this side of the House believed that no solution was to be found along the lines of the White Paper of 1939; and the Government therefore addressed themselves at once to the task of devising a different approach on which they could negotiate with the parties concerned. In view of the keen interest shown by American Jewry in the aspirations of Zionism, it was thought desirable that the Government of the United States should be associated with this endeavour; and as a result the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was appointed in November 1945. At the same time it was decided that Jewish immigration into Palestine should be temporarily continued at the rate of 1,500 a month notwithstanding the limit set by the White Paper, and an additional 21,000 Jews have already been admitted. Since July 1945 29,000 have been admitted. When the report of the Anglo-American Committee was received, we agreed with the United States Government that it should be examined by British and American officials. They jointly recommended the plan of Provincial Autonomy, which was described in this House by my right honourable friend the Lord President of the Council on 31st July, 1946. This plan gave us a basis for negotiation with the parties concerned; and no time was lost in inviting them to confer with us. Neither of the two communities in Palestine accepted this invitation, but a conference with representatives of the Arab States was opened in London in September of last year. After an adjournment due to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the conference was resumed in January, the

Palestine Arabs then joining in the discussions. The Jewish Agency have throughout refused to participate in the conference although informed that all proposals would be open for discussion, but it has been possible in this last phase to have conversations on an informal basis with representatives of the Agency.

From the outset both Arabs and Jews declined to accept as a basis for discussion the Provincial Autonomy plan put forward by His Majesty's Government. The Arabs put forward an alternative proposal under which Palestine would achieve early independence as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. His Majesty's Government, seeing no prospect of negotiating a settlement on that basis, put forward new proposals of their own. These envisaged the establishment of local areas, Arab and Jewish, with a substantial degree of autonomy within a unitary State, with a central Government in which both Arabs and Jews would share. These proposals provided that Jewish immigrants should be admitted over the next two years at the rate of 4,000 a month, and that thereafter the continuance and rate of Jewish immigration should be determined, with due regard to economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council, or in the event of disagreement by an Arbitration Tribunal appointed by the United Nations. This plan, while consistent with the principles of the mandate, added an element which has hitherto been lacking in our administration of Palestine, namely, a practical promise of evolution towards independence by building up, during a five-year period of trusteeship, political institutions rooted in the lives of the people. It was offered as a basis of discussion.

These three solutions have already been made known in broad outline, and we intend to lay before the House later in the week a White Paper describing each of them in greater detail.

The latest proposals of His Majesty's Government were rejected outright by both the Arab delegations and the representatives of the Jewish Agency, even as a basis for discussion. I think it important that

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the House should understand clearly the reasons which prompted the two sides to reject this solution. For the Arabs the fundamental point is that Palestine should no longer be denied the independence which has now been attained by every other Arab State; and that, in accordance with the accepted principles of democracy, the elected majority should be free to determine the future destiny of the country. They regard the further expansion of the Jewish National Home as jeopardising the attainment of national independence by the Arabs of Palestine, which all Arab States desire; and they are therefore unwilling to contemplate further Jewish immigration into Palestine. They are equally opposed to the creation of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine.

The Jewish Agency, on the other hand, have made it clear that their fundamental aim is the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine. With this in view they first proposed that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the mandate on a basis which would enable them to continue to expand the Jewish National Home until such time as they had attained by immigration a numerical majority in Palestine and could demand the creation of an independent Jewish State over the country as a whole. When it was made clear that His Majesty's Government were unable to maintain in Palestine a mandatory Administration under the protection of which such a policy could be carried out, the representatives of the Jewish Agency indicated that, while still maintaining the justice of their full claim, they would be prepared to consider as a compromise proposals for the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine." While they were not themselves willing to propose a plan of partition, they were prepared to consider such a proposal if advanced by His Majesty's Government.

His Majesty's Government have thus been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. For the Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of

Palestine. The discussions of the last month have clearly shown that there is no prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties. But if the conflict has to be resolved by an arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty's Government are empowered, as mandatory, to take. His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power, under the terms of the mandate, to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them.

It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable either to accept the scheme put forward by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own. We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations. We intend to place before them an historical account of the way in which His Majesty's Government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last twenty-five years. We shall explain that the mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation, namely, the Arab plan, Zionist aspirations so far as we have been able to ascertain them, the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee and the various proposals which we ourselves have put forward. We shall then ask the United Nations to consider our report and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not ourselves intend to recommend any particular solution.

Though we shall give immediate notice of our intentions, we see great difficulty in having this matter considered by the United Nations before the next regular session of the General Assembly in September. We regret that the final settlement should be subject to this further delay, particularly in view of the continuing strain on the British Administration and services during this further period. We trust, however, that, as the question is now to be referred to the United Nations, all concerned will exercise restraint until their judgment is known.

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[E/1534/2/31]

E. 1534

Parliamentary Statements  
February 18, 1947  
Section 1.

20 FEB PALESTINE

Statement by the Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P., in the  
House of Commons on the 18th February 1947.

<sup>very</sup>  
I am sorry to have to inform the House that the Conference  
with the Arabs and the consultations with the Zionist  
Organisation about the future of Palestine which have  
been proceeding in London have come to an end because it  
has become clear that there is no prospect of reaching  
by this means any settlement which would be even broadly  
acceptable to the two communities in Palestine.

<sup>Para.</sup>  
Ever since they took office the Government have laboured  
incessantly to find a solution of the Palestine problem.  
Most Members on this side of the House believed that no  
solution was to be found along the lines of the White  
Paper of 1939; and the Government therefore addressed  
themselves at once to the task of devising a different  
approach on which they could negotiate with the parties  
concerned.

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In view of the keen interest shown by American Jewry in the aspirations of Zionism, it was thought desirable that the Government of the United States should be associated with this endeavour; and as a result the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was appointed in November 1945.

At the same time it was decided that Jewish immigration into Palestine should be temporarily continued at the rate of 1,500 a month notwithstanding the limit set by the White Paper, and an additional 21,000 Jews have already been admitted, *since the W.P. was amended, & since July 1945 29,000 have been admitted.* When the Report of the Anglo-American Committee was received, we agreed with the United States Government that it should be examined by British and American officials.

They jointly recommended the plan of Provincial Autonomy which was described in this House by my right honourable Friend, the Lord President of the Council on 31st July 1946.

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- This plan gave us a basis for negotiation with the parties concerned; and no time was lost in inviting them to confer with us.

Neither of the two committees in Palestine accepted this invitation, but a conference with representatives of the Arab States was opened in London in September of last year.

After an adjournment due to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Conference was resumed in January, the Palestine Arabs then joining in the discussions.

The Jewish Agency have throughout refused to participate in the Conference although informed that all proposals would be open for discussion, but it has been possible in this last phase to have conversations on an informal basis with representatives of the Agency.

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~~re~~ from the outset both Arabs and Jews declined to accept as

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by an Arbitration Tribunal appointed by the United Nations.

—This plan, while consistent with the principles of the Mandate, added an element which has hitherto been lacking in our administration of Palestine, namely, a practical promise of evolution towards independence by building up, during a five-year period of trusteeship, political institutions rooted in the lives of the people.

—It was offered as a basis of discussion.

*Para 4/4* These three solutions have already been made known in broad outline, and we intend to lay before the House later in the week a White Paper describing each of them in greater detail.

*Para 4/4* The latest proposals of His Majesty's Government were rejected outright by both the Arab Delegations and the representatives of the Jewish Agency, even as a basis

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that their fundamental aim is the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine.

With this in view they first proposed that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate on a basis which would enable them to continue to expand the Jewish National Home until such time as they had attained by immigration a numerical majority in Palestine and could demand the creation of an independent Jewish State over the country as a whole.

When it was made clear that His Majesty's Government were unable to maintain in Palestine a mandatory administration under the protection of which such a policy could be carried out, the representatives of the Jewish Agency indicated that, while still maintaining the justice of their full claim, they would be prepared to consider as a compromise proposals for the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine".

While they were not themselves willing to propose a plan of/

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14

~~Para~~

There are 19 dialects about one million, two hundred  
thousand words and six hundred thousand Jews.

For the Law, the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign even State.

For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine.

The discussions of the last month have clearly shown that there is no ~~prospect~~ prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties.

that in the conflict has to be resolved by an arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty's Government/8

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Government are empowered, as Mandatory, to take.  
His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power,  
under the terms of the Mandate, to award the country  
either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to  
partition it between them.

*2/2/41* It is in these circumstances that we have decided that  
we are unable either to accept the scheme put forward  
by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves  
a solution of our own.

- We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only  
course now open to us is to submit the problem to the  
judgment of the United Nations.

- We intend to place before them an historical account of  
the way in which His Majesty's Government have  
discharged their trust in Palestine over the last  
twenty-five years.

- We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be  
unworkable/ 9

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September, 1910



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We trust, however, that, as the question is now to be referred to the United Nations, all concerned will exercise restraint until their judgment is known.

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Enter 18

~~20 Feb 1947~~

INDEXED

FROM S. OF S. COLONIES.

Sent 15th February, 1947. 15.15 hrs.

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**No. 324 Top Secret.**

His Majesty's Government have considered the situation arising out of the refusal of both Arabs and Jews to accept the proposals outlined in my telegram No.255 as a basis for further discussion.

2. His Majesty's Government are satisfied that the fears of both Arabs and Jews are so acute that there is no prospect even of unwilling acquiescence in the proposals. This being so, His Majesty's Government are not prepared to put the policy into effect on their own authority alone. They have reached the conclusion that it is impossible for us alone to arrive at a peaceful settlement in Palestine on any basis whatever.

3. His Majesty's Government therefore propose to give immediate notice of their intention to refer the problem of Palestine to the judgment of the General Assembly of the United Nations. They will place before the Assembly an historical account of the discharge by the United Kingdom of its trust in Palestine. They will explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable, that it has imposed on the Mandatory an impossible task, and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities have proved irreconcilable. They will describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the resulting situation, namely, the present Arab plan, Zionist aspirations so far as they have been able to ascertain them, and their own proposals. They will then ask the General Assembly to consider this report and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We see no prospect of getting the report considered by the United Nations before the next regular session of the Assembly in September.

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5. A statement to the above effect will be made in Parliament early next week, probably on Tuesday. I will telegraph text of statement as soon as it is settled. There will probably be a debate later in the week.

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MS.25  
Secretary of State  
Sir T. Lloyd  
Mr. Martin  
Sir D. Harris

Lord President of the Council.  
No.10 Downing Street  
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" "  
" "

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Mr. E. Wilson Smith.

*(The following information was obtained from the records of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Office of the Assistant Secretary for Health Policy and Statistics, Division of Health Care Statistics, Bureau of Health Data Administration.)*

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*7534/2 71*

**OUTWARD TELEGRAM**

Cypher (O.T.P.)

**TO PALESTINE** (General Sir A. Cunningham)

**FROM S. OF S., COLONIES.**

Sent 15th February, 1947. 15.30 hrs.

**IMMEDIATE**

No. 331 Secret.

Palestine Conference.

Final meeting with Arab Delegations was held on 14th February. Foreign Secretary said that His Majesty's Government had been impressed by the unanimity with which both parties had rejected the recent British proposals. It was with profound regret that His Majesty's Government had to admit failure, for the first time in British history, to solve a problem of this kind. They had decided to refer the matter to the United Nations, setting out the history of the problem and of the various solutions which had hitherto been recommended, including the plan put forward by the Arab Delegations and the British plan. His Majesty's Government would not make a recommendation in favour of any one solution but would accept the decision arrived at by the United Nations. He asked the Arab Governments to apply their minds to the question whether the problem could not be solved between now and the time when the matter was brought before the United Nations.

2. All Arab Delegates made solemn affirmations that their countries would not be a party to any solution of the Palestine problem based on a plan in which the idea of partition was given effect, directly or indirectly, in any of its forms.

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3. Arab Delegates then asked that, since the British Government thought fit to take the matter to the United Nations, the situation in Palestine should not be allowed to deteriorate at the expense of the Arabs during the interim period. They regarded the White Paper of 1939 as being still in force but Jewish immigration was still continuing beyond provisions of that document. It had been decided by His Majesty's Government that immigration should continue at the rate of 1,500 a month during the period of the investigations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. This period was over but immigration had continued and the Arabs did not know where they stood. Foreign Secretary said that this was a matter which would require consideration. His Majesty's Government attitude was that the status quo should be maintained during the interim period. They felt that the continuance of a small immigration quota until the United Nations reached a decision would not upset the situation in Palestine very much but what had been said in this connection would certainly be considered.

4. I said I very much regretted that no solution had been found at the Conference. It would now fall to the British Government to try to maintain the situation in Palestine until the United Nations made their decision. I knew it would be a very difficult period because of the divergence of interest between the two communities in Palestine who both felt they had right and justice on their side. Britain had always sought to retain the goodwill of both parties. She wanted only to secure the happiness and prosperity of Palestine. Arabs and Jews might perhaps think that the British administration had its shortcomings but co-operation had in practice proved very difficult to obtain.

5. The Conference concluded with expressions of appreciation on both sides for the cordial and friendly spirit in which negotiations had been conducted.

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# 22 OUTWARD TELEGRAM

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" "	- Mr. E.A. Armstrong.
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War Office	- C.I.G.S.
" "	- M.I.3A.
" " (M.O.4.)	- Lt. Col. J.G. Atkinson.
Admiralty	- Mr. G.C.B. Dodds.
Air Ministry	- Private Secretary.
Ministry of Defence	- Private Secretary.
" " "	- Sir H. Wilson Smith.

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With the Compliments of the  
Under Secretary of State for Dominion  
Affairs. 19 FEB 1947

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## OUTWARD TELEGRAM

2.5730/  
EN CLAIR

FROM: D.O.  
TO: CANADA (GOVT.)  
AUSTRALIA "  
NEW ZEALAND "  
SOUTH AFRICA "

(Sent 4.30 p.m. 18th Feb., 1947.)

D. No. 161-

Palestine.

Following is text of statement being made in Parliament today,  
18th February. Begins.

I am sorry to have to inform the House that the Conference with the Arabs and the consultations with the Zionist Organisation about the future of Palestine which have been proceeding in London have come to an end because it has become clear that there is no prospect of reaching by this means any settlement which would be even broadly acceptable to the two communities in Palestine.

2. Ever since they took office the Government have laboured incessantly to find a solution of the Palestine problem. Most Members of this side of the House believed that no solution was to be found along the lines of the White Paper of 1939; and the Government therefore addressed themselves at once to the task of devising a different approach on which they could negotiate with the parties concerned. In view of the keen interests shown by American Jewry in the aspirations of Zionism, it was thought desirable that the Government of the United States should be associated with this endeavour; and as a result the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was appointed in November, 1945. At the same time it was decided that Jewish immigration into Palestine should be temporarily continued at the rate of 1,500 a month notwithstanding the limit set by the White Paper, and an additional 21,000 Jews have already been admitted. When the Report of the Anglo-American Committee was received, we agreed with the United States Government that it should be examined by British and American officials. They jointly recommended the plan of Provincial Autonomy which was described in this House by my Right Honourable Friend, the Lord President of the Council on 31st July, 1946. This plan gave us a basis for negotiation with the parties concerned; and no time was lost in inviting them to confer with us. Neither of the two communities in Palestine accepted this invitation, but a Conference with representatives of the Arab States was opened in London in September of last year. After an adjournment due to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Conference was resumed in January, the Palestine Arabs then joining in the discussions. The Jewish Agency have throughout refused to participate in the Conference, although informed that all proposals would be open for discussion, but it has been possible in this last phase to have conversations on an informal basis with representatives of the Agency.

3. From the outset both Arabs and Jews declined to accept as a basis for discussion the Provincial Autonomy plan put forward by His Majesty's Government. The Arabs put forward an alternative proposal under which Palestine would achieve early independence as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. His Majesty's Government, seeing no prospect of negotiating a settlement on that basis, put forward new proposals of their own. These envisaged the establishment of local areas, Arab and Jewish, with a substantial degree of autonomy within a unitary State, with a central Government in which both Arabs and Jews would share. These proposals provided that Jewish immigrants should be admitted over the next two years at the rate of 4,000 a month, and that thereafter the continuance and rate of Jewish immigration should/

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4. These three solutions have already been made known in broad outline, and we intend to lay before the House later in the week a White Paper describing each of them in greater detail.


6. The Jewish Agency on the other hand, have made it clear that their fundamental aim is the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine. With this in view they first proposed that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate on a basis which would enable them to continue to expand the Jewish National Home until such time as they had attained by immigration a numerical majority in Palestine and could demand the creation of an independent Jewish State over the country as a whole. When it was made clear that His Majesty's Government were unable to maintain in Palestine a mandatory administration under the protection of which such a policy could be carried out, the representatives of the Jewish Agency indicated that, while still maintaining the justice of their full claim, they would be prepared to consider as a compromise proposals for the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine". While they were not themselves willing to propose a plan of Partition they were prepared to consider such a proposal if advanced by His Majesty's Government.

7. His Majesty's Government have thus been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. For the Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. The discussions of the last month have clearly shown that there is no present prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties. But if the conflict has to be resolved by an arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty's Government are empowered, as Mandatory, to take. His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power, under the terms of the Mandate, to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them.

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8. It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable either to accept the scheme put forward by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own. We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations. We intend to place before them an historical account of the way in which His Majesty's Government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last 25 years. We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation, namely, the Arab plan, Zionist aspirations so far as we have been able to ascertain them, the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee and the various proposals which we ourselves have put forward. We shall then ask the United Nations to consider our report and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solution.

9. Though we shall give immediate notice of our intentions, we see great difficulty in having this matter considered by the United Nations before the next regular Session of the General Assembly in September. We regret that the final settlement should be subject to this further delay, particularly in view of the continuing strain on the British administration and services during this further period. We trust, however, that, as the question is now to be referred to the United Nations, all concerned will exercise restraint until their judgment is known.

Copy to:-

Foreign Office	Sir D. Scott Mr. J.P.G. Finch (8) Mr. H. Beeley
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Telegram. *LD*

No. ....

(Date) .....

Repeat to  
*Washington 1564.1*  
*Cairo 385*  
*Bagdad 155*  
*Jidda 84.*  
*Beirut 110*  
*Damascus 81*  
*Ammah 66.*  
*BME 179. V*

En Clair.

Code.

Cypher.

Distribution :—

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OUT FILE *E. O., 18* *26*  
Despatched *5-18* 194 *M.*

MOST IMMEDIATE

~~*I have to-day*~~  
My immediately following  
telegram contains the text of  
a statement on Palestine which  
I have to-day made in the  
House of Commons. The same  
statement was made by Viscount  
Hall in the House of Lords.

*Wm 18/2*

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Reference:

FO 371/61740

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27

En Clair

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO :-

D. 5.18 p.m. February 18th, 1947.

JJJ

MOST IMMEDIATE

My immediately following telegram contains the text of a statement on Palestine which I have to-day made in the House of Commons. The same statement was made by Viscount Hall in the House of Lords.

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OUT FILE

MOST IMMEDIATE

[Klein & Co] Refers to AME 200  
my tel 18018

E

My immediately preceding telegram.

TOP SECRET

Following is text.

PALESTINE

Feb. 15

Draft of Statement in House of Commons

Washington 1570

Barro 386

Bagdad 156

Jeddah 85

Beirut 117

Damascus 82

Amman 67

B.M.E. 0780

Feb. 18.

Enclain

by plane

by air

Distn.

I am sorry to have to inform the House that the Conference with the Arabs and the consultations with the Zionist Organisation about the future of Palestine which have been proceeding in London have come to an end because it has become clear that there is no prospect of reaching by this means any settlement which would be even broadly acceptable to the two communities in Palestine.

2. Ever since they took office the Government have laboured incessantly to find a solution of the Palestine problem. Most Members of this side of the House believed that no solution was to be found along the lines of the White Paper of 1939; and the Government therefore addressed themselves at once to the task of devising a different approach on which they could negotiate with the parties concerned. In view of the keen interest shown by American Jewry in the aspirations of Zionism, it was thought desirable that the Government of the United States should be associated with this endeavour; and as a result the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was appointed in November, 1945. At the same time it was decided that Jewish immigration into Palestine should be temporarily continued at the rate of 1,500 a month notwithstanding the limit set by the White Paper, and an additional 21,000 Jews have already been admitted. When the Report of the Anglo-American Committee was received, we agreed with the United States Government that it should be examined by British and American officials. They jointly recommended the plan of Provincial Autonomy which was described in this House by my Right Honourable Friend, the Lord President of the Council on 31st July, 1946. This plan gave us a basis for negotiation with the parties concerned; and no time was lost in inviting them to confer with us. Neither of the two communities in Palestine accepted this invitation, but a Conference with representatives of the Arab States was opened in London in September of last year. After an adjournment due to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Conference was resumed in January, the Palestine Arabs then joining in the discussions. The Jewish Agency have throughout refused to participate in the Conference, although informed that all proposals would be open for discussion, but it has been possible in this last phase to have conversations on an informal basis with representatives of the Agency.

3. From the outset both Arabs and Jews declined to accept as a basis for discussion the Provincial Autonomy plan put forward by His Majesty's Government. The Arabs put forward an alternative proposal under which Palestine would achieve early independence as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. His Majesty's Government, seeing no prospect of negotiating a settlement on that basis, put forward new proposals of their own. These envisaged the establishment of local areas, Arab and Jewish, with a substantial degree of autonomy within a unitary State, with a central Government in which both Arabs and Jews would share. These proposals provided that Jewish immigrants should be admitted over the next two years at the rate of 4,000 a month, and that thereafter the continuance and rate of Jewish immigration

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should be determined, with due regard to economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council, or in the event of disagreement by an Arbitration Tribunal appointed by the United Nations. This plan, while consistent with the principles of the Mandate, added an element which has hitherto been lacking in our administration of Palestine, namely, a practical promise of evolution towards independence by building up, during a five-year period of trusteeship, political institutions rooted in the lives of the people. It was offered as a basis of discussion.

4. These three solutions have already been made known in broad outline, and we intend to lay before the House later in the week a White Paper describing each of them in greater detail.

5. The latest proposals of His Majesty's Government were rejected outright by both the Arab Delegations and the representatives of the Jewish Agency even as a basis for discussion. I think it important that the House should understand clearly the reasons which prompted the two sides to reject this solution. For the Arabs, the fundamental point is that Palestine should no longer be denied the independence which has now been attained by every other Arab State; and that, in accordance with the accepted principles of democracy, the elected majority should be free to determine the future destiny of the country. They regard the further expansion of the Jewish National Home as jeopardising the attainment of national independence by the Arabs of Palestine, which all Arab States desire; and they are therefore unwilling to contemplate further Jewish immigration into Palestine. They are equally opposed to the creation of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine.

6. The Jewish Agency on the other hand, have made it clear that their fundamental aim is the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine. With this in view they first proposed that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate on a basis which would enable them to continue to expand the Jewish National Home until such time as they had attained by immigration a numerical majority in Palestine and could demand the creation of an independent Jewish State over the country as a whole. When it was made clear that His Majesty's Government were unable to maintain in Palestine a mandatory administration under the protection of which such a policy could be carried out, the representatives of the Jewish Agency indicated that, while still maintaining the justice of their full claim, they would be prepared to consider as a compromise proposals for the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine". While they were not themselves willing to propose a plan of Partition they were prepared to consider such a proposal if advanced by His Majesty's Government.

7. His Majesty's Government have thus been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. For the Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. The discussions

of/

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of the last month have clearly shown that there is no present prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties. But if the conflict has to be resolved by an arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty's Government are empowered, as Mandatory, to take. His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power, under the terms of the Mandate, to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them.

*them*

*United Nations*

8. It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable either to accept the scheme put forward by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own. We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations. We intend to place before ~~the General Assembly~~ an historical account of the way in which His Majesty's Government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last 25 years. We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation, namely, the Arab plan, Zionist aspirations so far as we have been able to ascertain them, the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee and the various proposals which we ourselves have put forward. We shall then ask ~~the General Assembly~~ to consider our report and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solution.

9. Though we shall give immediate notice of our intentions, we see great difficulty in having this matter considered by the United Nations before the next regular Session of the General Assembly in September. We regret that the final settlement should be subject to this further delay, particularly in view of the continuing strain on the British Administration and services during this further period. We trust, however, that, as the question is now to be referred to the United Nations, all concerned will exercise restraint until their judgment ~~of the Assembly~~ is known.

*mm*  
*18/2*

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OUT FILE

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(E)

En Clair

CABINET DISTRIBUTION.

FROM FOREIGN OFFICE TO WASHINGTON No. 1570,  
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AMMAN No. 67,  
BRITISH MIDDLE EAST  
OFFICE CAIRO No. 180.

18th February, 1947. D. 7.52 p.m. 18th February, 1947.

3 3 3

MOST IMMEDIATE.

[To Cairo only] Please pass to British Middle  
East Office as my telegram No. 18018.

My immediately preceding telegram.

Following is text.

I am sorry to have to inform the House that the  
Conference with the Arabs and the consultations with the  
Zionist Organisation about the future of Palestine which  
have been proceeding in London have come to an end because  
it has become clear that there is no prospect of reaching  
by this means any settlement which would be even broadly  
acceptable to the two communities in Palestine.

2. Ever since they took office the Government have  
laboured incessantly to find a solution of the Palestine  
problem. Most Members of this side of the House believed  
that no solution was to be found along the lines of the  
White Paper of 1939; and the Government therefore  
addressed themselves at once to the task of devising a  
different/

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- 3 -

to have conversations on an informal basis with representatives of the Agency.

3. From the outset both Arabs and Jews declined to accept as a basis for discussion the Provincial Autonomy plan put forward by His Majesty's Government. The Arabs put forward an alternative proposal under which Palestine would achieve early independence as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. His Majesty's Government, seeing no prospect of negotiating a settlement on that basis, put forward new proposals of their own. These envisaged the establishment of local areas, Arab and Jewish, with a substantial degree of autonomy within a unitary State, with a central Government in which both Arabs and Jews would share. These proposals provided that Jewish immigrants should be admitted over the next two years at the rate of 4,000 a month, and that thereafter the continuance and rate of Jewish immigration should be determined, with due regard to economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council, or in the event of disagreement by an Arbitration Tribunal appointed by the United Nations. This plan, while consistent with the principles of the Mandate, added an element which has hitherto been lacking in our administration of Palestine, namely, a practical promise of evolution towards independence by building up, during a five-year period of trusteeship, political institutions rooted in the lives of the people. It was offered as a basis of discussion.

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4. These three solutions have already been made known in broad outline, and we intend to lay before the House later in the week a White Paper describing each of them in greater detail.

5. The latest proposals of His Majesty's Government were rejected outright by both the Arab Delegations and the representatives of the Jewish Agency even as a basis for discussion. I think it important that the House should understand clearly the reasons which prompted the two sides to reject this solution. For the Arabs, the fundamental point is that Palestine should no longer be denied the independence which has now been attained by every other Arab State; and that, in accordance with the accepted principles of democracy, the elected majority should be free to determine the future destiny of the country. They regard the further expansion of the Jewish National Home as jeopardising the attainment of national independence by the Arabs of Palestine, which all Arab States desire; and they are therefore unwilling to contemplate further Jewish immigration into Palestine. They are equally opposed to the creation of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine.

6. The Jewish Agency on the other hand, have made it clear that their fundamental aim is the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine. With this in view they first proposed that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate on a basis which would enable them to continue to expand the Jewish National Home until such time as they had attained by immigration a numerical majority in Palestine and could demand the creation/

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8. It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable either to accept the scheme put forward by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own. We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations. We intend to place before them an historical account of the way in which His Majesty's Government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last 25 years. We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation, namely, the Arab plan, Zionist aspirations so far as we have been able to ascertain them, the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee and the various proposals which we ourselves have put forward. We shall then ask the United Nations to consider our report and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solution.

9. Though we shall give immediate notice of our intentions, we see great difficulty in having this matter considered by the United Nations before the next regular session of the General Assembly in September. We regret that the final settlement should be subject to this further delay, particularly in view of the continuing strain on the British Administration and services during this further period. We trust, however, that, as the question is now to be referred to the United Nations, all concerned will exercise restraint until their judgment is known.

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JARY 1947 (Government Policy)

of devising a different approach on which they could negotiate with the parties concerned. In view of the keen interest shown by American Jewry in the aspirations of Zionism, it was thought desirable that the Government of the United States should be associated with this endeavour; and as a result the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was appointed in November, 1945. At the same time it was decided that Jewish immigration into Palestine should be temporarily continued at the rate of 1,500 a month notwithstanding the limit set by the White Paper, and an additional 21,000 Jews have been admitted since the White Paper terminated; and since July, 1945, 29,000 have been admitted.

When the Report of the Anglo-American Committee was received, we agreed with the United States Government that it should be examined by British and American officials. They jointly recommended the plan of Provincial Autonomy which was described in this House by my right hon. Friend the Lord President of the Council on 31st July, 1946. This plan gave a basis for negotiation with the parties concerned; and no time was lost in inviting them to confer with us. Neither of the two communities in Palestine accepted this invitation, but a conference with representatives of the Arab States was opened in London in September of last year. After an adjournment, due to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Conference was resumed in January, the Palestine Arabs then joined in the discussions. The Jewish Agency have throughout refused to participate in the Conference, although informed that all proposals would be open for discussion, but it has been possible in this last phase to have conversations on an informal basis with representatives of the Agency.

From the outset, both Arabs and Jews declined to accept as a basis for discussion the provincial autonomy plan put forward by His Majesty's Government. The Arabs put forward an alternative proposal, under which Palestine would achieve early independence as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. His Majesty's Government, seeing no prospect of negotiating a settlement on that basis, put forward new proposals of their own. These envisaged the establishment of local areas, Arab and Jewish, with a substantial degree of autonomy

#### PALESTINE CONFERENCE (GOVERNMENT POLICY)

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Mr. Bevin): Sir, I am very sorry to have to inform the House that the Conference with the Arabs and the consultations with the Zionist Organisation about the future of Palestine which have been proceeding in London have come to an end because it has become clear that there is no prospect of reaching by those means any settlement which would be even broadly acceptable to the two communities in Palestine. Ever since they took office the Government have laboured incessantly to find a solution of the Palestine problem. Most Members on this side of the House believed that no solution was to be found along the lines of the White Paper of 1939; and the Government therefore addressed themselves at once to the task



[Mr. Bevin.]  
within a unitary State, with a central government in which both Arabs and Jews would share. These proposals provided that Jewish immigrants should be admitted over the next two years at the rate of 4,000 a month, and that thereafter the continuation of the rate of Jewish immigration should be determined, with due regard to economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his advisory council, or, in the event of disagreement, by an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations. This plan, while consistent with the principles of the Mandate, added an element which has hitherto been lacking in our administration of Palestine, namely, a practical promise of evolution towards independence by building up, during a five year period of trusteeship, political institutions rooted in the lives of the people. It was offered as a basis of discussion. These three solutions have already been made known in broad outline, and we intend to lay before the House later in the week a White Paper describing each of them in greater detail.

The latest proposals of His Majesty's Government were rejected outright by both the Arab delegations and the representatives of the Jewish Agency, even as a basis for discussion. I think it important that the House should understand clearly the reasons which prompted the two sides to reject this solution. For the Arabs, the fundamental point is that Palestine should no longer be denied the independence which has now been attained by every other Arab State; and that, in accordance with the accepted principles of democracy, the elected majority should be free to determine the future destiny of the country. They regard the further expansion of the Jewish National Home as jeopardising the attainment of national independence by the Arabs of Palestine, which all Arab States desire; and they are therefore unwilling to contemplate further Jewish immigration into Palestine. They are equally opposed to the creation of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine.

The Jewish Agency, on the other hand, have made it clear that their fundamental aim is the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine. With this in view they first proposed that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the mandate on a basis which would enable them to continue to expand the

Jewish National Home until such time as they had attained by immigration a numerical majority in Palestine and could demand the creation of an independent Jewish State over the country as a whole. When it was made clear that His Majesty's Government were unable to maintain in Palestine a mandatory administration under the protection of which such a policy could be carried out, the representatives of the Jewish Agency indicated that, while still maintaining the justice of their full claim, they would be prepared to consider, as a compromise, the proposal for the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine." While they were not themselves willing to propose a plan of partition, they were prepared to consider such a proposal if advanced by His Majesty's Government.

His Majesty's Government have thus been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. For the Jews the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. The discussions of the last month have quite clearly shown that there is no prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties. But if the conflict has to be resolved by arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty's Government are empowered as Mandatory to take.

His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power, under the terms of the Mandate, to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them. It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable to accept the scheme put forward either by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own. We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations. We intend to place before them an historical account of the way in which His Majesty's Government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last 25 years. We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice, and that the obligations undertaken to the two com-

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munities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation, namely, the Arab Plan, the Zionists' aspirations, so far as we have been able to ascertain them, the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee, and the various proposals which we ourselves have put forward. We shall then ask the United Nations to consider our report, and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solution.

Though we shall give immediate notice of our intentions, we see great difficulty in having this matter considered by the United Nations before the next regular session of the General Assembly in September. We regret that the final settlement should be subject to this further delay, particularly in view of the continuing strain on the British Administration and Services during this further period. We trust, however, that as the question is now to be referred to the United Nations all concerned will exercise restraint until their judgment is known.

**Mr. Churchill:** Are we to understand that we are to go on bearing the whole of this burden, with no solution to offer, no guidance to give—the whole of this burden of maintaining law and order in Palestine, and carrying on the administration, not only until September, which is a long way from February, not only until then, when the United Nations are to have it laid before them, but until those United Nations have solved the problem, which the right hon. Gentleman has declared himself, after 18 months of protracted delay, incapable of offering any solution to? How does he justify keeping 100,000 British soldiers in Palestine, who are needed here, and spending £30 million to £40 million a year from our diminishing resources upon this vast apparatus of protraction and delay?

**Mr. Bevin:** I very much regret this rhetorical display about protracted delay; because, if any two men, the ex-Colonial Secretary, now the First Lord, and I, have devoted, in the middle of a world crumbling to disaster from the war, efforts to solve this one problem, we have. I think for any hon. Member or right hon. Member to accuse us of protracted delay in trying to grapple with this problem, is totally unjust. The problem raised by

the right hon. Gentleman is a matter which has got to be considered. So far as I can see from the constitution of the United Nations, it is rather difficult to get procedure other than that of the Assembly. But we have not communicated with them yet. There may be preliminary work that may be done; there may be improvised action, or something. But I assure the House we are not going to neglect it. I have a feeling that both the Jews and the Arabs, if they want to maintain dignity in their case, should be careful of their actions during this interim period. So far as immigration is concerned, at least 1,500 a month will go on. I have made that perfectly clear.

**Mr. Boyd-Carpenter:** At least 1,500?

**Mr. Bevin:** Fifteen hundred a month will go.

**Mr. Boyd-Carpenter:** Or more?

**Mr. Bevin:** I beg pardon. I understand the point now. Fifteen hundred, guaranteed during the interim period, will continue to go in.

**Mr. Keeling:** No more?

**Mr. Bevin:** I do not understand. At the moment I commit myself to the 1,500 a month, nothing further, nothing less. I cannot give any other pledge. I do not think the Government have done badly, with, since the end of the war, 29,000 Jews transported. I realise the difficulties in Europe. I think neither the country nor the world realises what we have done in admitting those people. I still want to make one further appeal to other countries in the world—to the United States of America and to everybody else—to help us with these displaced persons.

**Mr. Churchill:** No one would suggest that the right hon. Gentleman does not give his full attention and strength to the discharge of his extremely complicated and painful duty. We all bear witness to the exhaustive efforts he has made, and to speak of delay is in no sense a reflection on his personal devotion to duty. But I am entitled to ask the question; whether what has been announced today does not mean at least a year will pass, while the British Government remain, on their own confession without any solution of the Palestine problem, before any solution is provided from another quarter; and

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[Mr. Churchill.]

whether that is not exposing us to an unduly heavy burden, both in the absorption of our manpower, and in the further depletion of our financial resources? If this policy is right today—and this is another question I wish to ask—why could it not have been announced 12 months ago?

**Mr. Stokes:** Would not the situation have been greatly simplified if the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford (Mr. Churchill) had stuck to his own White Paper of 1922?

**Mr. Bevin:** I think that the hon. Member for Ipswich (Mr. Stokes) and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Woodford could provide us with a very gay time. I think it would be a fatal policy for Great Britain, with all the leadership she has shown in the world and all her history, to have gone to the United Nations without attempting to exhaust every possibility. After all, the right hon. Gentleman was, I believe, in office, and he had a hand in this business right at the end of the last war, in the Lloyd George Coalition; and other hon. Members opposite have also had a hand in the administration of this great problem. Let me say this: I know the cost and I know the difficulties, but if we handle this well at the United Nations and exercise care, and if in the end the problem of the Jews and Arabs can, in some way, be settled after 2,000 years of conflict, 12 months will not be a long delay.

**Mr. Churchill:** Perhaps I may be permitted, by way of personal explanation, as the hon. Gentleman opposite has made a statement, to say that I had nothing to do with that White Paper—

**Mr. Stokes:** The White Paper of 1922

**Mr. Churchill:** It is quite true. I stand entirely by the White Paper of 1922. I am entirely opposed to the other White Paper which was issued before the war, and always have been. May I ask when an opportunity will be given to Debate this difficult and entangled problem?

**Mr. Bevin:** I understand that question will be dealt with through the usual channels, and that an opportunity will be given.

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**Mr. Janner:** Pending the remitting of this question to the United Nations, are we to understand that the Mandate stands, and that we shall deal with the situation of immigration and land restrictions on the basis of the terms of the Mandate, and that the White Paper of 1939 will be abolished?

**Mr. Bevin:** No, Sir. We have not found a substitute yet for that White Paper, and up to the moment, whether it is right or wrong, the House is committed to it. That is the legal position. We did, by arrangement and agreement, extend the period of immigration which would have terminated in December, 1945. Whether there will be any further change, my right hon. Friend the Colonial Secretary, who, of course, is responsible for the administration of the policy, will be considering later.

**Mr. Oliver Stanley:** In order to be correct, it is not a fact that the right hon. Gentleman extended the period. The period lapsed during the time of the Coalition Government and it was extended by them. I think that the right hon. Gentleman meant to say that he had added to the numbers

**Mr. Bevin:** No, Sir. I stand to be corrected, but I understand that the White Paper came to an end on 31st December, 1945, and one of my first duties as Foreign Secretary was to take the whole thing up, about continuing immigration, with the Arabs and with the Arab states at that time. [An HON. MEMBER: "What was the number?"] The number was 75,000. I am really saying the same thing. Perhaps the right hon. Gentleman has forgotten that he was out of office at that time.

**Mr. Stanley:** The right hon. Gentleman should, at least, be accurate. What happened was that there were two things in the White Paper. There was the number, the 75,000, and the time they had to be in; after which it stopped. The time ran out while I was Colonial Secretary, and it was extended by the Coalition Government. The number ran out in 1945, and was extended by the Foreign Secretary

**Mrs. Ayrton Gould:** Are we to understand from my right hon. Friend that nothing is going to be done, during the period between now and the decision of the United Nations, to enable the moderate Jewish majority to control the minority? Is he aware that if the present

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circumstances continue, it is inevitable that there will be an appalling amount of terrorist activity in Palestine?

**Mr. Speaker:** We seem to be getting now to the stage of debating Palestine.

**Mr. Gallacher:** Are we to take it from the statement that after 30 years' delay the Balfour Declaration is recognised to be utterly unrealistic?

**Mr. Speaker:** That is another of these debating questions.

**Mr. Wilson Harris:** On the question of procedure, are we to understand that this question is to go to the United Nations under the head of "trusteeship"? Is there any reason why it should not go to the Security Council as a matter endangering international peace? It certainly does that, much more than the Spanish situation of which the Security Council took cognizance.

**Mr. Bevin:** When the League of Nations was wound up, there was a guarantee by the Mandatory Powers that they would carry on their Mandates and treat the United Nations as if they were the League of Nations. Therefore, I have to have regard to that. I do not think it is endangering the security of the world, and I do not think, personally, it is a Security Council matter. I am aware that Spain and other things went to the Security Council, but it was rather a new toy that year.

**Mr. Pickthorn:** I would not for the world ask an argumentative question at this stage, but I should like to ask whether, with due respect for our normal protocol, we might not ask the acting Leader of the House to let us know now, when and where, and in what form, we are to debate this question so that we can keep our argumentative questions till then? Can we know that now?

**Mr. Greenwood:** This disorderly practice of people asking in advance of Thursday—

**Mr. Churchill:** On a point of Order. Has the acting Leader of the House any right to suggest that you, Sir, have countenanced disorderly practice?

**Mr. Speaker:** I did not understand the right hon. Gentleman to say that.

**Mr. Greenwood:** I meant to say, "tendency," Sir. I do not see why I should be challenged about this, because on two occasions I have said that at the earliest opportunity this subject should be debated. This is Tuesday, and I object to Members asking me, on a Tuesday, to state Business which would normally be announced on a Thursday. I can assure the House that a Debate will be held fairly early next week, but discussions have to go on, through the usual channels, about the alteration of Business for next week.

**Mr. Sydney Silverman:** Will the Foreign Secretary bear in mind that the House generally will be appreciative of the careful attempt he has made to state the conflicting views of the two sides? Further, will he say whether—in view of His Majesty's Government's experience over so many years—in arriving at that conclusion, there does not lie a moral responsibility on the Government to offer some advice to the United Nations, instead of merely flinging this problem at their heads without offering any suggestions?

**Mr. Bevin:** We have carefully studied this matter, and put forward proposal after proposal. They are there, and I personally do not think that we can offer to the United Nations any more proposals. We shall leave them on the table. They, in turn, may have better ones, but this is the best we can do.

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EXTRACT FROM  
HOUSE OF LORDS DEBATES  
18 FEB 1947

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of Zionism it was thought desirable that the Government of the United States should be associated with this endeavour and as a result an Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry was appointed in November, 1945. At the same time it was decided that Jewish immigration into Palestine should be temporarily continued at the rate of 1,500 a month notwithstanding the limits set by the White Paper, and an additional 21,000 Jews have already been admitted. When the Report of the Anglo-American Committee was received we agreed with the United States Government that it should be examined by British and American officials. They jointly recommended the plan of provisional autonomy which was described by my right honourable friend the Lord President of the Council on July 31, 1946.

This plan gave us a basis for negotiation with the parties concerned and no time was lost in inviting them to confer with us. Neither of the two communities in Palestine accepted this invitation, but a conference with representatives of the Arab States was opened in London in September of last year. After an adjournment, due to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Conference was resumed in January, the Palestine Arabs then joining in the discussions. The Jewish Agency have throughout refused to participate in the Conference, although informed that all proposals would be open for discussion, but it has been possible in this last phase to have conversations on an informal basis with representatives of the Agency.

From the outset both Arabs and Jews declined to accept as a basis for discussion the provisional autonomy plan put forward by His Majesty's Government. The Arabs put forward an alternative proposal, under which Palestine would achieve early independence as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. His Majesty's Government, seeing no prospect of negotiating a settlement on that basis, put forward new proposals of their own. These envisaged the establishment of local areas, Arab and Jewish, with a substantial degree of autonomy within a unitary State

#### PALESTINE.

3.50 p.m.

VISCOUNT HALL: My Lords, the following is a statement on Palestine which is being made by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in another place, and according to the usual practice your Lordships would wish it to be made also in your Lordships' House.

The following is the statement:

I am sorry to have to inform the House that the Conferences with the Arabs and the consultations with the Zionist Organization about the future of Palestine, which have been proceeding in London, have come to an end because it has become clear that there is no prospect of reaching, by this means, any settlement which would be even broadly acceptable to the two communities in Palestine. Ever since they have taken Office the Government have laboured incessantly to find a solution to the Palestine problem. Most members on this side of the House believed that no solution could be found along the lines of the White Paper of 1939, and the Government, therefore, addressed themselves at once to the task of devising a different approach on which they could negotiate with the parties concerned.

In view of the keen interest shown by American Jewry in the aspirations

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[Viscount Hall.]

with a Central Government in which both Arabs and Jews would share.

These proposals provided that Jewish immigrants would be admitted over the next two years at the rate of 4,000 a month, and that thereafter the continuance and rate of Jewish immigration should be determined, with due regard to economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council, or, in the event of disagreement, by an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations. This plan, while consistent with the principles of the mandate, added an element which has hitherto been lacking in our administration of Palestine—namely, a practical promise of evolution tending towards independence by building up during a five-year period of trusteeship political institutions rooted in the lives of the people. It was offered as a basis of discussion. These three solutions have already been made known in a broad outline, and we intend to lay before the House later in the week a White Paper describing each of them in greater detail.

The latest proposals of His Majesty's Government were rejected outright by both the Arab Delegations and the representatives of the Jewish Agency, even as a basis for discussion. I think it important that the House should understand clearly the reasons which prompted the two sides to reject this solution. For the Arabs the fundamental point is that Palestine should no longer be denied the independence which has now been attained by every other Arab State and that in accordance with the accepted principles of democracy the elected majority should be free to determine the future destiny of the country. They regard the further expansion of the Jewish national home as jeopardizing the attainment of national independence by the Arabs of Palestine, which all Arab States desire, and they are therefore unwilling to contemplate further Jewish immigration into Palestine. They are equally opposed to the creation of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine.

The Jewish Agency, on the other hand, have made it clear that their

fundamental aim is the creation of a independent Jewish State in Palestine. With this in view they first proposed that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate on a basis which would enable them to continue to expand the Jewish National Home until such time as they had attained by immigration a numerical majority in Palestine and could demand the creation of an independent Jewish State over the country as a whole. When it was made clear that His Majesty's Government were unable to maintain in Palestine a mandatory administration under the protection of which such a policy could be carried out, the representatives of the Jewish Agency indicated that, while still maintaining the justice of their full claim, they would be prepared to consider, as a compromise, proposals for the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine." While they were not themselves willing to propose a plan of partition they were prepared to consider such a proposal if advanced by His Majesty's Government.

His Majesty's Government have thus been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. For the Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish state. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. The discussions of the last month have clearly shown that there is no present prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties. But if the conflict has to be resolved by an arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty's Government are empowered, as Mandatory, to take. His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power under the terms of the Mandate to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them.

It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable either to accept the scheme put forward by the Arabs or by the Jews or to impose ourselves a solution of our own. We have, therefore, reached the conclusion that

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the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations. We intend to place before them an historical account of the way in which His Majesty's Government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last twenty-five years. We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice, and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation—namely, the Arab Plan, Zionist aspirations so far as we have been able to ascertain them, the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee and the various proposals which we ourselves have put forward. We shall then ask the United Nations to consider our Report and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solution.

Though we shall give immediate notice of our intentions, we see great difficulty in having this matter considered by the United Nations before the next regular Session of the General Assembly in September. We regret that the final settlement should be subject to this further delay, particularly in view of the continuing strain on the British Administration and Services during this further period. We trust, however, that, as the question is now to be referred to the United Nations, all concerned will exercise restraint until their judgment is known.

4.3 p.m.

VISCOUNT CRANBORNE: My Lords, I should like, if I may, to thank the First Lord of the Admiralty for the very full statement which he has made with regard to the position in Palestine. Clearly, this statement is historic. It has disclosed the failure of the Government—I use the word "failure" in no offensive sense—to find, despite their utmost efforts, a basis of agreement acceptable to both the Arabs and the Jews, and their decision to submit the whole problem to the United Nations. Whether this step might have been rendered unnecessary by earlier and more resolute action I do not propose to discuss to-day. But we do recognize, of course, in all quarters of the House, the immense difficulties with which the Government have been faced, and we recognize that,

very likely, they have no other course open to them at the present time than that which they have taken. At any rate, I do not propose to discuss it to-day, but I would like to give notice to the Government that we shall put down a Motion for debate at an early date.

VISCOUNT SAMUEL: My Lords, in all quarters of the House regret will be felt that the discussions which have taken place should have resulted in failure, though such a result was by no means unexpected. In the present situation there is little doubt that the only course open to the Government is to make a reference to the United Nations, though I am sure that in all quarters of the House the regret of the Government will be shared that so long a delay will be involved before consideration of this question by the United Nations can be undertaken. Meanwhile, we would all wish to abstain to-day from engaging in any discussion, especially in view of the notice which has been given by the noble Viscount, the Leader of the Opposition, to ask for a debate at any early date in your Lordships' House.

LORD STRABOLGI: My Lords, I do not wish to enlarge this discussion in any way but I would like to ask my noble friend, the First Lord of the Admiralty, if I may, two questions which I think are important and practical. There is bound to be—as the noble Viscount has reminded your Lordships—considerable delay before this problem is considered by the United Nations, and in the meantime, there are certain problems of administration in Palestine about which I think the House is entitled to some information, particularly in view of what fell from the lips of my noble friend with regard to the White Paper of 1939. In the interim, which may be very long—it may be a year or more before there is a more satisfactory settlement—what is going to happen with regard to immigration? I do not gather that any new figure has been announced. Secondly—and this is quite urgent—are the present restrictions on the purchase of land in Palestine to be maintained in force? I would be very grateful if my noble friend, the First Lord of the Admiralty, can give me some information on those two points.

VISCOUNT HALL: The two matters which have been referred to by my noble

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[Viscount Hall.]  
 friend, Lord Strabolgi, are two of many  
 which are now being considered by the  
 Government. I desire to express my  
 thanks to the two noble Viscounts who  
 have spoken very briefly upon the state-  
 ment which has been made, and I can  
 assure them that a day will be set aside  
 at an early date for a debate in your  
 Lordships' House on this matter.

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59



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E 1537

49

1947

PALESTINE

20 FEB

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E1537/2/31

Embassy

Bagdad

42

236/13/47

10 Feb 1947

20 Feb 1947

Palestine H.M.G. - Proposals

Refers 70 tels 113 & 114 (E1231/2/31)  
 Encloses Bagdad Note Verbale no 67  
 of Feb 10 to Mty of Foreign Affairs  
 transmitting 19 M.G. proposals for a  
 settlement of the Palestine question.

Last Paper.

1534

References.

(Minutes.)

H.B. 207/12

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

E1537/2/2

5/6/48

Next Paper.

E1581

32003 F.O.P.

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British.....Embassy,  
Bagdad.

E 1537

10th February, 1947.

*Reference to previous correspondence:*

Foreign Office telegrams 113 and 114.

*Description of Enclosure.*

Name and Date.	Subject.
<p>Bagdad Note Verbale No. 67 of 10th February, 1947, to Ministry of Foreign Affairs.</p>	<p>Proposals for a settlement of the Palestine question.</p> <div data-bbox="1383 1542 1654 1811" data-label="Image"> <p>A circular ink stamp from the Embassy of the United Kingdom in Baghdad. The outer ring of the stamp contains the text 'EMBASSY OF THE UNITED KINGDOM' at the top and 'BAGDAD' at the bottom. In the center, there is a date stamp that reads '10 FEB 1947'. Overlaid on the date is a handwritten signature or set of initials.</p> </div>

A circular black and white stamp from the Embassy of the United States in Baghdad. The text "EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES" is curved along the top inner edge, and "BAGDAD" is curved along the bottom inner edge. In the center, there is a date stamp that reads "1968" and some illegible handwritten or stamped text below it. The stamp appears to be a collection or filing mark.

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## Reference

FO 371 61743



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NOTE VERDALE.

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Reference: FO 371 61760

complete/



complete independence, and this period of transition would be fixed at five years.

The proposals would be embodied in a trusteeship agreement. His Majesty's Government believe that they are in conformity both with the obligations already resting on them under the mandate and with the provision of Article 76 of the United Nations Charter.

There would necessarily be an interval between the present discussions and the conclusion of a trusteeship agreement but if it appeared that the suggested policy would command sufficient acquiescence in Palestine, His Majesty's Government could no doubt make interim arrangements in harmony with this policy before it was formally approved by the United Nations.

The essential features of the proposed trusteeship agreement are as follows.

Areas of local administration would be delimited in such a way as to include in each a substantial majority either of Arabs or of Jews. Neither the whole of Arab territory nor the whole of Jewish territory would necessarily be contiguous. A reasonably wide range of powers would be granted to local administrations. There would be safeguards for the rights of Jewish minorities in the Arab areas and of Arab minorities in Jewish areas.

The document states that the British Delegation cannot accept the contention of representatives of the Jewish Agency that the rate of Jewish immigration into Palestine as a whole should be determined by the Jews alone. Nor can they accept the demands of Arab delegations that all Jewish immigration into Palestine should cease forthwith. They do not contemplate either a settlement which would bring to an end the development of a Jewish national home or the admission/

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admission of Jewish immigrants without reference to the effect of their entry on the rights and position of the non-Jewish population of the country. Any provision made for future Jewish immigration must rest upon consideration for the well-being of Palestine as a whole.

With this end in view, the trusteeship agreement would provide for Jewish immigration at a rate of 4,000 monthly, for a period of two years. This would guarantee the entry of approximately 100,000 additional Jewish immigrants. During the remainder of the period of trusteeship, the continuance of immigration and rate of entry would be determined, with due regard to the principle of economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council; and in the event of disagreement the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations.

Control over transfers of land, including power to amend existing land transfer regulations, would be conferred on local authorities.

The High Commissioner would continue to exercise supreme legislative and executive authority. He would however endeavour to form an Advisory Council so composed as to include representatives not only of Arab and Jewish local administrations but also of labour, cultural and other organised interests. Despite this composition, it is probable that voting in the Advisory Council would tend at first to follow communal lines. Since, however, the functions of the Council would be advisory and not legislative, the High Commissioner would be required to give due attention to the views of minorities. On conclusion of the trusteeship agreement Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the

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official channel of communication between the Jewish community and the High Commissioner.

During the period of trusteeship the High Commissioner would introduce Palestinians into his Executive Council and would progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members of the Advisory Council.

At the end of four years a Constituent Assembly would be elected. If the majority of its Jewish members and the majority of its Arab members failed to reach agreement on the terms of a constitution the Trusteeship Council would be asked to advise on the next move.

The object of the administering authority during the five years of trusteeship would be to prepare Palestine for independence. His Majesty's Government are not prepared to continue indefinitely to govern Palestine themselves merely because Arabs and Jews cannot agree upon the means of sharing its government between them. They have therefore devised a plan which should give the two peoples an opportunity of demonstrating their ability to work together for the good of Palestine as a whole and so providing a stable foundation for an independent State.

His Majesty's Embassy avails itself of this opportunity to renew the expression of its highest consideration.

British Embassy,

BAGDAD.

10th February, 1947.

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E 1581

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1947

PALESTINE

21 FEB

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 1581/2/31.

Sir N. Brook.

to Dept.

15 Feb 1947  
21 Feb 1947Palestine Conference.

Submit draft of statement to be made  
in House of Commons. Prepared in  
consultation with officials of C.O. & F.P.  
Assumes that Prof P will make statement.  
Informal Colonial Secretary agrees.

Last Paper.

1537

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

In P.P. minutes to Sir Brook.  
Containing Prof P amendments 17/2.

In P.P. minute by Mr. Henriches,  
Notes for Supplementary Q's on Statement, 18/2

H.B. 21/2

(Action  
completed)

(Index.)

f.d. 11/3

11/3  
26/6/48

Next Paper.

E 1720

32003 F.O.P.

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FO

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FOREIGN SECRETARY

Palestine

I submit for your consideration a draft of the statement which is to be made in the House of Commons next week. This has been prepared in consultation with officials of the Foreign Office and Colonial Office.

I am submitting a copy to the Colonial Secretary.

I am assuming that you will make the statement in the House of Commons. The Colonial Secretary agrees that you should do so.

Norman Brook

15th February, 1947

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TOP SECRET

Copy No. (1)

PALESTINE

Draft for Statement in House of Commons

1. I am sorry to have to inform the House that His Majesty's Government have thought it right to bring to an end the discussions about the future of Palestine which have been proceeding in London with representatives of the Arabs and the Jews, as it has become clear that there is no prospect of reaching by this means any settlement which would be even broadly acceptable to the two communities in Palestine.

2. Ever since they took office the Government have laboured incessantly to find a solution of the Palestine problem. Members on this side of the House have never believed that any solution was to be found along the lines of the White Paper of 1939; and the Government therefore addressed themselves at once to the task of devising a different approach which they could negotiate with the parties concerned. In view of the keen interest shown by American Jewry in the aspirations of Zionism, it was thought desirable that the Government of the United States should be associated with this endeavour; and as a result the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was appointed in November, 1945. At the same time it was decided that Jewish immigration into Palestine should be temporarily continued at the rate of 1,500 a month notwithstanding the limit set by the White Paper. When the Report of the Anglo-American Committee was received, we arranged for it to be examined by

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British and American officials, who jointly recommended the plan of Provincial Autonomy which was described in this House by my right hon. Friend, the Lord President of the Council on 31st July, 1946. This plan gave us a basis for negotiation with the parties concerned; and no time was lost in inviting them to confer with us. Neither of the two communities in Palestine accepted this invitation, but a Conference with representatives of the Arab States was opened in London in September of last year and, after an adjournment due to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, was resumed in January, the Palestine Arabs then joining in the discussions. The Jewish Agency have throughout refused to participate in the Conference, but it has been possible in this last phase to hold parallel conversations on an informal basis with representatives of the Agency.

3. From the outset both sides declined to accept as a basis for discussion the Provincial Autonomy plan put forward by His Majesty's Government. The Arabs put forward an alternative proposal under which Palestine would achieve early independence as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. His Majesty's Government, seeing no prospect of negotiating a settlement on that basis, put forward new proposals of their own. These envisaged the establishment of local areas, Arab and Jewish, with a substantial degree of autonomy within a unitary State, with a central Government in which both Arabs and Jews would share. These proposals provided for the admission of Jewish immigrants over the next two years at the rate of 4,000 a month and for further immigration thereafter by agreement between the two

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communities or, failing that, by arbitration under the United Nations. This plan, while consistent with the principles of the Mandate, added an element which has hitherto been lacking in our administration of Palestine, namely, a practical promise of evolution towards independence by building up, during a five-year period of trusteeship, political institutions rooted in the lives of the people.

4. These three solutions have already been made known in broad outline, and we intend to lay before the House later in the week a White Paper describing each of them in greater detail.

5. Our latest proposals, like all the other proposals which have been put forward by His Majesty's Government, were rejected outright by both the Arabs and the Jews, even as a basis for discussion. I think it important that the House should understand clearly the reasons which prompted the two sides to reject this solution. For the Arabs, the fundamental point is that Palestine should no longer be denied the independence which has now been attained by every other Arab State; and that, in accordance with the accepted principles of democracy, the ~~Arab~~ <sup>elected</sup> majority should be free to determine the future destiny of the country. They regard the further expansion of the Jewish National Home as jeopardising the attainment of national independence by the Arabs of Palestine; and they are therefore unwilling to contemplate further Jewish immigration into Palestine. They are equally opposed to the creation of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine.

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6. The Jews, on the other hand, have made it clear that their fundamental aim is the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine. With this in view they first proposed that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate on a basis which would enable them to continue to expand the Jewish National Home until such time as they had attained by immigration a numerical majority in Palestine and could demand the creation of an independent Jewish State over the country as a whole. When it was made clear that His Majesty's Government were not prepared to maintain indefinitely in Palestine a tutelary administration under the protection of which such a policy could be carried out, the representatives of the Jewish Agency indicated that, while still maintaining the justice of their full claim, they would be prepared to consider as a compromise proposals for the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine". While they were not themselves willing to propose a plan of Partition they were prepared to consider such a proposal if advanced by His Majesty's Government.

7. His Majesty's Government have thus been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. For the Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. The discussions of the last month have clearly shown that there is no present prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties. But if the conflict has to be

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resolved by an arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty's Government are empowered, as Mandatory, to take. His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power, under the terms of the Mandate, to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them.

8. It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable either to accept the solution put forward by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a ~~solution~~ of our own. We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations. We intend to place before the General Assembly an historical account of the way in which His Majesty's Government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last 25 years. We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation, namely, the Arab plan, Zionist aspirations so far as we have been able to ascertain them, and our own proposals. We shall then ask the General Assembly to consider our report and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solution.

9. Though we shall give immediate notice of our intentions, we see no prospect of having this matter considered by the United Nations before the next regular

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Session of the General Assembly in September. His Majesty's Government greatly regret that this should be so. We regret that the final settlement should be subject to this further delay; and we regret that the two communities in Palestine and the British administration and troops should be left in a state of suspense for this further period. We trust, however, that, as the question is now to be referred to the United Nations, all concerned will exercise restraint until their judgment is known.

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**FO** 371 / 61740



17th February, 1947.

**IMMEDIATE.**

Dear Brock,

The Foreign Secretary has seen the draft statement on Palestine and generally approves the line. He has, however, suggested three amendments as follows:-

- 1) He wishes a passage inserted giving the figures included in the marked passage in our telegram to Washington no. 1502, of which I enclose a copy. This will presumably mean some re-drafting of para 2, of the statement.
- 2) In paragraph 5), the phrase in the third sentence which reads " the Arab majority should be free to determine" should read "the elected majority should be free to determine".
- 3) In paragraph 7), he wishes a further sentence inserted after the third sentence on the following lines: "The difficulty of reconciling these conflicting claims has been increased by the fact that there are some 600,000 Jews in Palestine, while there are some 1,200,000 Arabs and that the discussions...

I am sending a copy of this letter to Edmonds at the Colonial Office.

(Sgd.) J. P. E. C. HENNIKER

Sir N. Brook, K.C.B.,  
Cabinet Offices.

FO 371/61740



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Secretary of State.

You asked me to find out the total number of immigrants into Palestine between the assumption of office by the Government at the end of July 1945 and the present time. The figure is approximately 29,000. It is made up of 21,000 from mid-December 1945 until now, plus 1,500 a month between July and December, 1945.

*J. H. Hume*

18th February, 1947.

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P A L E S T I N E

Notes for Supplementary Questions on Statement in the  
House of Commons on the 18th February 1947.

- (1) What are we going to do in the interval before the question is considered by the United Nations? Shall we modify the rate of Jewish immigration?

ANSWER:

Consideration is now being given to representations made by both Arabs and Jews on the subject of interim policy in Palestine.

We do not wish to prejudice in any way the consideration of the whole problem by the United Nations.

(2) /

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- (2) Must there be a delay until September? Could we **not** convene a special meeting of the General Assembly, or ask some other organ of the United Nations to consider the question?

ANSWER:

As I have said, we see great difficulty in having the problem of Palestine considered by the United Nations before September.

But we are giving further thought to this question.

(3) /

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- (3) Why are we proposing to make no recommendation to the United Nations?

ANSWER:

We believe that our latest proposals are a reasonable basis to find agreement.

We prepared them as a basis for negotiation with Arabs and Jews.

We find, however, that neither party is prepared to negotiate with us on this basis, and we have therefore decided to submit the problem to the United Nations.

We hope that the United Nations will give full consideration to the whole problem, and we do not wish to pre-determine the lines of their discussion.

(4) /

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- (4) Have we consulted the Government of the United States?

ANSWER:

The United States Government have been kept fully and continuously informed of all recent developments.

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69

TOP SECRET

PALESTINE

Draft for Statement in House of Commons  
and House of Lords.

1. I am sorry to have to inform the House that the Conference with the Arabs and the consultations with the Zionist Organisation about the future of Palestine which have been proceeding in London have come to an end because it has become clear that there is no prospect of reaching by this means any settlement which would be even broadly acceptable to the two communities in Palestine.
2. Ever since they took office the Government have laboured incessantly to find a solution of the Palestine problem. Most Members on this side of the House believed that no solution was to be found along the lines of the White Paper of 1939; and the Government therefore addressed themselves at once to the task of devising a different approach on which they could negotiate with the parties concerned. In view of the keen interest shown by American Jewry in the aspirations of Zionism, it was thought desirable that the Government of the United States should be associated with this endeavour; and as a result the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry was appointed in November, 1945. At the same time it was decided that Jewish immigration into Palestine should be temporarily continued at the rate of 1,500 a month notwithstanding the limit set by the White Paper, and an additional 21,000 Jews have already been admitted. When the Report of the Anglo-American Committee was received, we agreed with the United States Government that it should be examined by British and American officials. They jointly recommended the plan of Provincial Autonomy which was described

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in this House by my right hon. Friend, the Lord President of the Council on 31st July, 1946. This plan gave us a basis for negotiation with the parties concerned; and no time was lost in inviting them to confer with us. Neither of the two communities in Palestine accepted this invitation, but a Conference with representatives of the Arab States was opened in London in September of last year. After an adjournment due to the meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Conference was resumed in January, the Palestine Arabs then joining in the discussions. The Jewish Agency have throughout refused although informed that all proposals would be open for discussion to participate in the Conference, but it has been possible in this last phase to have conversations on an informal basis with representatives of the Agency.

P.M. (1)

3. From the outset both Arabs and Jews declined to accept as a basis for discussion the Provincial Autonomy plan put forward by His Majesty's Government. The Arabs put forward an alternative proposal under which Palestine would achieve early independence as a unitary State with a permanent Arab majority. His Majesty's Government, seeing no prospect of negotiating a settlement on that basis, put forward new proposals of their own. These envisaged the establishment of local areas, Arab and Jewish, with a substantial degree of autonomy within a unitary State, with a central Government in which both Arabs and Jews would share. These proposals provided that Jewish immigrants should be admitted over the next two years at the rate of 4,000 a month, and that thereafter the continuance and rate of Jewish immigration should be determined, with due regard to economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in

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consultation with his Advisory Council, or in the event of disagreement by an Arbitration Tribunal appointed by the United Nations. This plan, while consistent with the principles of the Mandate, added an element which has hitherto been lacking in our administration of Palestine, namely, a practical promise of evolution towards independence by building up, during a five-year period of trusteeship, political institutions rooted in the lives of the people. It was offered as a basis of discussion.

4. These three solutions have already been made known in broad outline, and we intend to lay before the House later in the week a White Paper describing each of them in greater detail.

5. The latest proposals of His Majesty's Government were rejected outright by both the Arabs and the <sup>Delegations</sup> ~~Zionists~~ <sup>representatives of the Jewish Agency</sup>, even as a basis for discussion. I think it important that the House should understand clearly the reasons which prompted the two sides to reject this solution. For the Arabs, the fundamental point is that Palestine should no longer be denied the independence which has now been attained by every other Arab State; and that, in accordance with the accepted principles of democracy, the elected majority should be free to determine the future destiny of the country. They regard the further expansion of the Jewish National Home as jeopardising the attainment of national independence by the Arabs of Palestine, which all Arab States desire; and they are therefore unwilling to contemplate further Jewish immigration into Palestine. They are equally opposed to the creation of a Jewish State in any part of Palestine.

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6. <sup>Jewish Agency</sup> The ~~Zionists~~ on the other hand, have made it clear that their fundamental aim is the creation of an independent Jewish State in Palestine. With this in view they first proposed that His Majesty's Government should continue to administer the Mandate on a basis which would enable them to continue to expand the Jewish National Home until such time as they had attained by immigration a numerical majority in Palestine and could demand the creation of an independent Jewish State over the country as a whole. When it was made clear that His Majesty's Government were unable to maintain in Palestine a <sup>mandatory</sup> ~~tutelar~~ administration under the protection of which such a policy could be carried out, the representatives of the Jewish Agency indicated that, while still maintaining the justice of their full claim, they would be prepared to consider as a compromise proposals for the creation of "a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine". While they were not themselves willing to propose a plan of Partition they were prepared to consider such a proposal if advanced by His Majesty's Government.

7. His Majesty's Government have thus been faced with an irreconcilable conflict of principles. There are in Palestine about 1,200,000 Arabs and 600,000 Jews. For the Jews, the essential point of principle is the creation of a sovereign Jewish State. For the Arabs, the essential point of principle is to resist to the last the establishment of Jewish sovereignty in any part of Palestine. The discussions of the last month have

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clearly shown that there is no present prospect of resolving this conflict by any settlement negotiated between the parties. But if the conflict has to be resolved by an arbitrary decision, that is not a decision which His Majesty's Government are empowered, as Mandatory, to take. His Majesty's Government have of themselves no power, under the terms of the Mandate, to award the country either to the Arabs or to the Jews, or even to partition it between them.

8. It is in these circumstances that we have decided that we are unable either to accept the scheme put forward by the Arabs or by the Jews, or to impose ourselves a solution of our own. We have therefore reached the conclusion that the only course now open to us is to submit the problem to the judgment of the United Nations. We intend to place before the <sup>the</sup> General Assembly ~~an~~ historical account of the way in which His Majesty's Government have discharged their trust in Palestine over the last 25 years. We shall explain that the Mandate has proved to be unworkable in practice and that the obligations undertaken to the two communities in Palestine have been shown to be irreconcilable. We shall describe the various proposals which have been put forward for dealing with the situation, namely, the Arab plan, Zionist aspirations so far as we have been able to ascertain them, <sup>the proposals of the Anglo-American Committee of the various</sup> ~~and our own proposals.~~ We shall then <sup>which we ourselves</sup> ask the <sup>United Nations</sup> ~~General Assembly~~ to consider our report and to recommend a settlement of the problem. We do not intend ourselves to recommend any particular solution. <sup>have put forward</sup>

P.M. 11

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9. Though we shall give immediate notice of our intentions, we see <sup>great difficulty in</sup> ~~no prospect of~~ having this matter considered by the United Nations before the next regular Session of the General Assembly in September. His Majesty's Government ~~greatly regret that this should be so.~~ We regret that the final settlement should be subject to this further delay, particularly in view of the continuing strain on the British Administration and Services during this further period. We trust, however, that, as the question is now to be referred to the United Nations, all concerned will exercise restraint until the judgment ~~of the Assembly~~ is known.

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4.  
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Palestine.

Possible supplementary questions on to-day's  
statement in Parliament.

(1) What are we going to do in the interval before  
the question is considered by the United Nations?  
Shall we modify the rate of Jewish immigration?

Answer:

Consideration is now being given to representations  
made by both Arabs and Jews on the subject of interim  
policy in Palestine. We do not wish to prejudice in  
any way the consideration of the whole problem by the  
United Nations, ~~and we shall therefore endeavour so  
far as possible to maintain the status quo in Palestine  
during the interval.~~

(2) Must there be a delay until September? Could  
we not convene a special meeting of the General Assembly,  
or ask some other organ of the United Nations to  
consider the question?

Answer:

As I have said, we see great difficulty in having  
the problem of Palestine considered by the United Nations  
before September. But we are giving further thought  
to this question.

(3) Why are we proposing to make no recommendation  
to the United Nations?

Answer:

*a reasonable*  
*been tried before*  
We believe that our latest proposals are ~~just and~~  
~~reasonable, but we~~ prepared them as a basis for negoti-  
ation with Arabs and Jews. We find, however, that  
neither/

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E

E 1720

1547

PALESTINE

26 FEB

Registry  
Number

E1720/2/31

FROM

Legation

No.

Beirut

Dated

27

Received  
in Registry

(34/36/47)

14 Feb 1947

26 Feb 1947

*Palatine Conference, Arab Higher Committee.  
Copy of note of Feb 14 addressed to  
Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs  
re the Participation of the Arab Higher  
Committee in the London Conference.*

Last Paper.

15-81

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

473. 267  
12

(Action  
completed.)

98 Mar 7/12

(Index)

5/6/48

Next Paper.

E1779

32003 F.O.P

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Reference:

FO 371 / 61749

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N<sup>o</sup> 27 (34/36/47)

HIS Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Beirut  
presents his compliments to Prin. Sec. of State for For.  
Affairs and has the honour to transmit to him the under-mentioned  
documents.

British Legation.....

Beirut.....

14th February, 1947.....

Reference to previous correspondence:

Description of Enclosure.

Name and Date.	Subject.
Copy of Note no. 32 dated 14th February, 1947, addressed to the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.	Participation of Arab Higher Committee in the London Conference.



3479A 22862-2 (4)

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Reference:

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The Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs,  
BEIRUT.

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Reference: **FO** 371 6174



62

E

E 1779

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1947

PALESTINE

27 FEB

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E1779/2/31.

E.A. Armstrong

Bobb off

to Mr Gault

25 Feb 1947

27 Feb 1947

Palestine Conference Secretariat.

Suggests it would be useful to round  
off work of Palestine Conference Secretariat  
by a statement of the Secretariat and  
administrative arrangements connected  
with the Conference. Earlier suggested  
draft, asks amendment etc.

Last Paper.

1720

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Oft E.A. Armstrong

CBE

Bobb off

Mr Gault

from Mr Gault

Mar. 13

(Action  
completed.)

(Index.)

Next Paper.

E1886

(Minutes.)

This is a useful summary of procedure  
dfr letter to Mr Armstrong.

CMZ  
6/5

In P.P. Record of Admin' and Secretariat  
of Palestine Conference.

H.B. 25/3

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CONFIDENTIAL

PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946/47

ADMINISTRATIVE AND SECRETARIAL ARRANGEMENTS

Note by the Secretary.

General

1. The Palestine Conference began on 10th September, 1946 and was adjourned on 2nd October, 1946. It was resumed on 27th January 1947 and concluded on 14th February 1947. The principal purpose of the adjournment was to enable His Majesty's Government to give consideration to the plan proposed by the Arabs at the first session of the Conference, and the date originally fixed for resumption was 16th December, 1946; this date was determined in the light of the engagements of the British and Arab Delegates, including the General Assembly of the United Nations and the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers which were to take place in New York during the autumn. The prolongation of the adjournment was due, beyond 16th Dec. in part, to the fact that the session of the General Assembly of the United Nations was unexpectedly long; a further reason was that His Majesty's Government felt it desirable to defer the resumption of the Conference until it could be seen whether, as a result of the Zionist Congress held at Basle during the latter part of December, the Jews might decide to attend the Palestine Conference when it resumed.

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2.

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meetings were taken into the same account by His Majesty's Government as if the Jews had formally participated. A list of the British and Arab Delegates to the Conference and of the Jewish Agency representatives, who attended outside the Conference, is given in Appendix I.

Allocation of Departmental Responsibilities

3. Responsibility for the administrative and secretarial arrangements was shared by four departments viz., the Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Cabinet Office and the Government Hospitality Fund.

The Secretary of the Conference acted as general co-ordinator of these arrangements, the details of which are shown in Appendix II. In general, the Foreign Office were responsible, through their Conference Department, for ~~all, what~~ ~~in military parlance may call~~ the "Q" side of the Conference (except ~~the~~ ~~the~~ the buffet and canteen) and, through their Eastern Department, for other matters affecting the welfare of individual Arab Delegations. The division, as regards other subjects, ~~as~~ between the Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Cabinet Office was a more or less arbitrary one designed to spread the ~~work~~ ~~involved~~ <sup>current</sup> in the light of departmental commitments ~~at the time~~, and staff available. It

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4. The first session of the Conference was held at Lancaster House, the whole of which, except for a very few rooms was made available. The main Conference Room in this building was extremely suitable and there were smaller Conference Rooms for the Delegates adjoining. The accommodation for the Secretariat and other staff was ample and there were good rooms for Press, buffet and canteen.

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Foreign Office Claims Department, for the Secretariat. The Press Section was, however, accommodated in St. James's Palace. One of the chief drawbacks of the Palace was the difficulty of keeping the place warm during the very severe weather which prevailed during the whole of the second session of the Conference, and only one meeting was in fact held there. All other meetings took place in the large reception room at the Foreign Secretary's residence at 1, Carlton Gardens.

Secretariat and Other Staff

5. Details of the Secretariat and staff of the Conference are shown in Appendix III. The composition and numbers were based on the experience of the Palestine Conference of 1939 and were adequate for all purposes. The Secretariat were much assisted by the fact that the Foreign Office and Colonial Office had selected two senior officials, Mr. Beeley and Sir Douglas Harris, for full-time special duty in connection with the Conference.

Conference Committee

5A. During its first session, the Conference appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Norman Brook to elucidate alternative proposals put forward by the Arab Delegations. This Committee had five meetings. It was the only Committee set up by the Conference, although it is likely that if the Arabs had shown a less uncompromising attitude towards the final British proposals, further committees might have been set up.

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Conference Procedure

6. The following arrangements were agreed after preliminary consultations between the Secretariat and representatives of the Arab Delegations before the Conference began:-

(a) Language and Interpreters

English and Arabic were recognised languages for the purpose of the Conference. In practice all the Arab Delegates, except a very small number belonging to the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni Delegations, understood

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During the first session of the Conference <sup>a British</sup> ~~an~~ official interpreter was available and he translated Arabic speeches into English and

(b) Records of Meetings.

The Secretariat prepared full summaries of discussions and circulated them to the Delegates for their concurrence. Verbatim texts of the more important <sup>set</sup> speeches made by Delegates were reproduced in the minutes. Delegates were requested to send any amendments to draft minutes to the Secretariat not later than 24 hours after the receipt of a record of a meeting and the records, as amended, formed the only

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authoritative record of the proceedings. In practice the number of amendments made was small. The Arab Delegates did not object to, and indeed welcomed, the editing of their statements by the Secretariat. For speed of reproduction, the Secretariat adopted the practice of sharing the business of note-taking; after taking notes for half an hour or three-quarters of an hour the Secretary concerned would leave the Conference and dictate his notes - his place being taken by another Secretary. This arrangement worked well in practice, and it was always possible to circulate the minutes of a meeting by the first circulation on the day following.

(c) Circulation of Papers

By arrangement with the Arab Delegations, records of meetings and other relevant papers, were in the case of some Delegations sent to an individual nominated by the Delegations who made himself responsible for seeing that each member of his Delegation received the papers. In other cases, papers were addressed to individual Delegates. All papers were prepared for circulation and put into envelopes by the staff of the Secretariat and actual circulation was carried out sometimes by special delivery for which the Conference transport pool was used, sometimes through the Cabinet Office distribution office. There were four series of papers each of which had a special symbol, viz.

P.C.(A) Series, dealing with matters of administration or routine - circulated to all Delegates, British and Arab.

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P.C.(A)(P) Series, dealing with questions  
of policy - circulated to all delegates,  
British and Arab.

P.C.(A) (U.K.) Series circulated to  
British Delegates and Officials only.

P.C.(A)(P)(C) Series, dealing with matters  
coming before the Conference Committee -  
circulated to all Delegates, British and  
Arab.

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## 91

ADVISORY COMMITTEE TO THE  
BRITISH DELEGATION

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7. The Press arrangements were in the general charge of the Head of the Information Department of the Colonial Office. Two Press Officers were



9.

It was agreed in preliminary conference with

- (a) those taking part in the Conference should



During the first session of the Conference the Secretary of the Arab League, Azzam Pasha, and the Head of the Information Department of the Colonial Office, jointly held a number of Press Conferences which were well attended and sometimes lively. The Arab Delegations were quite content so far as could be ascertained that Azzam Pasha should speak on their behalf. No serious leakages of information about the proceedings of the Conference occurred from the Arab side.

from which Azzam Pasha was absent,

During the second session of the Conference, joint communiques, as necessary, were agreed with Dr. Jamali, the principal Delegate from Iraq, but there were no joint meetings with the Press as during the first session of the Conference. Dr. Jamali did, however, meet Press representatives separately. This did not, in fact, lead to any serious embarrassment.

An exception to the arrangement that representatives to the Press should not be admitted to meetings was allowed on the occasion of the first meeting of the Conference when Press photographers, B.B.C. recording engineers, cinema operators and reporters were permitted to enter the Conference Room to take photographs and to record the speeches made by the Prime Minister, who opened the Conference, and a representative of the Arab Delegations who replied.

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Thereafter all Press-men and  
photographers were required to withdraw.

Press photographers were also  
permitted to enter the Conference Room  
at the first meeting of the resumed  
Conference, but only for the purpose  
of taking photographs. They were  
required to leave after about five  
minutes.

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### Security and Passes

8. Responsibility for the safety of individual Arab Delegates at all times was undertaken by the Special Branch, Scotland Yard, under the direction of Inspector Holmes. Plain clothes officers from Scotland Yard were on duty outside the Conference Room at all meetings. In view of the disturbed state of Palestine and the frequent acts of violence perpetrated by Jewish terrorists both in and outside of Palestine, during the sessions of the Conference security was a matter of vital importance and special vigilance was necessary.

Passes for Delegates and Officials were issued by the Secretary, and for press representatives by the Colonial Office. Copies of lists of pass-holders were given to Scotland Yard. On the resumption of the Conference after the adjournment the passes first issued were withdrawn and replaced by fresh passes.

### Hospitality

9. Responsibility for entertaining the Arab Delegates was undertaken by the Government Hospitality Fund under the direction of Brigadier Greenfield. His Majesty's Government gave two receptions (at Lancaster House and 1 Carlton Gardens) and one dinner (at Admiralty House) in honour of the Arab Delegates. Before the dinner the guests attended a private <sup>ing</sup> show in the Admiralty Cinema of a film, which

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had just been released, entitled "Theirs is the Glory", depicting the battle of Arnham. A further means of showing hospitality to the Arabs was afforded by a buffet providing tea, coffee, non alcoholic drinks, cakes, fruit, etc., which was opened whenever possible after meetings of the Conference and Conference Committee. This buffet was very popular and gave Delegates and Officials an opportunity for useful informal discussion. The buffet (and the Canteen referred to below) was operated by NAAFI, who agreed to make the necessary arrangements after the Government Hospitality Fund had approached a number of catering firms without success. The services of NAAFI were only obtained after a high-level approach to the War Office. The arrangements they made were excellent although it was seldom possible to give them more than a few hours notice of requirements and numbers, and, during the later session of the Conference the Canteen was at Lancaster House and the NAAFI either at St. James's Palace or at 1 Carlton Gardens. All difficulties were willingly faced and successfully surmounted.

10. In addition to the more formal hospitality described above, entertainment was provided privately <sup>to</sup> ~~by~~ individual Arab Delegates and officials by British Officials who were authorised to claim reimbursement of expenditure approved for this purpose.

officials by British Officials



11. The return ~~to~~ hospitality offered by the Arabs was generous and cordial. Every Delegation (except the Palestine Arabs) held one or more reception and most gave lunches or dinners as well. Some of these functions were interfered with by the strike of hotel employees in October, 1946.

12. The hotel and travelling expenses of the Palestine Arabs, who had no funds of their own, were borne by His Majesty's Government.

13. With the approval of the Government Hospitality Fund and the Colonial Office, a canteen, also run by NAAFI, was set up for the Secretariat and Officials only. It provided lunches, teas and where late work was necessary, dinners at prices comparable to those charged at Departmental canteens in Whitehall. This canteen was

much ~~xxxxx~~ appreciated by all the staff and greatly contributed to working efficiency since no time was lost through members of the staff having to queue up for long periods at outside restaurants waiting for meals. The standard of service provided by NAAFI was extremely high.

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14. A Social Secretary was provided by the Foreign Office. His principal task was to keep in informal contact with the Arab Delegates, and to bring any points affecting their comfort or entertainment to the proper quarter and to accompany them on any visits where his presence would be useful to them. He dealt with questions connected with their hotel accommodation, saw that they obtained ration books, clothing coupons, etc., arranged air and steamship passages, and accompanied them to the "Britain Can Make It Exhibition" (then showing at the Victoria and Albert Museum) and to Portsmouth, where they were entertained to lunch by the Commander-in-Chief, Portsmouth, (Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton) and were shown H.M.S. Victory and H.M.S. Vanguard.

The Social Secretary (Mr. Naish) was fluent in Arabic and intimately acquainted with the Middle East.

# TRANSPORT

15. The Ministry of Supply made available for Conference purposes a pool of fourteen cars, together with a Transport Officer (Mr. Gardner). Under the standing arrangements, cars were sent to bring all Delegates, who had no cars of their own, to Conference meetings. Delegates requiring cars for other purposes were asked to telephone to the Transport Officer. One car was reserved for the use of the Secretariat and for administrative purposes.

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99  
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~. LIAISON WITH THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

16. The United States Government, having been represented on the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry on Palestine and later, on the Brook-Grady conversations between United States and United Kingdom Officials, were keenly interested in the Conference, though they did not send observers to it. It was agreed that the United States Embassy in London should be given as full information as possible of the way in which the Conference developed, and during the first session of the Conference this was done informally by means of contacts with the United States Embassy in London. The Secretary of the Committee had frequent meetings with representatives of the Embassy, and Sir Norman Brook also saw the ~~United States~~ Ambassador from time to time. During the adjournment, liaison with the Embassy was maintained by the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office and when the Conference resumed, it was found more convenient to revert to the practice adopted at the first session of the Conference. Much of the information given to the United States was of a highly confidential character which would not usually be given to a foreign Government, but in no case did the United States Representatives abuse the confidence reposed in them.

maintain this arrangement than to }

EXPENDITURE CONNECTED WITH THE CONFERENCE.

17. All expenditure incurred in connection with the Conference, excluding such expenses as would fall to the normal votes of Departments such as the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Works, <sup>was</sup> borne by the Colonial Office Vote.

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## APPENDIX I

(a) British Delegation:

**The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs**

**The Rt. Hon. George Hall, M.P.<sup>†</sup>, (Later Lord Hall)  
Secretary of State for the Colonies**

**The Rt. Hon. A. Creech Jones, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for the Colonies**

**Sir Norman Brook,  
Secretary of the Cabinet.**

(b) Arab Delegations

**Egypt:**

Abdel Razzak Ahmed<sup>+</sup>  
el Sanhoury Pasha

Ahmed Amin Bey<sup>+</sup>  
 Me Fathi el Akkad<sup>+</sup>  
 Me Abdul Monem Mostafa  
 Abdel Fattah Amr Pasha  
 Abdel Rahman Hakki Bey

Iraq:

Dr. Fadhil Jamali  
Mr. Arkhan Abadi  
Mr. Bashaiar

## Lebanon:

Camille Bey Chamoun  
M. Victor Kheury  
M. Nadim Dimechkie

**Palestine:**

Jamal Effendi Hussein  
Dr. Hussein Khalid  
Emile Effendi Ghoury  
Sami Effendi Taher  
Dr. Omar al Khalil  
Yusuf Effendi Sahyoun

Saudi Arabia:

**H.R.H. Amir Faisal<sup>+</sup>  
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba**

**Syria:**

Paris Bey Khouri  
Amir Adil Arslan  
Dr. Najib Armenazi

\* Present at first session of Conference only.

**Present at second session of Conference only.**

**\* Present at both sessions of Conference but as a delegate only at the second.**

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## Transjordan:

Samir Pasha Rifai<sup>+</sup>  
H.H. Abdul Majid Haider<sup>+</sup>  
Hani Bey Hashim<sup>+</sup>  
Dr. Fawzi Bey Mulki<sup>+</sup>

## Yemen:

H.R.H. Seif-al-Islam Abdullah  
Dr. Fawzi Bey Mulki  
El Sayid Hassan Ali Ibrahim  
Dr. Adnan Tarciei

## Arab League

**Abdur Rahman Azzam Pasha<sup>+</sup>**  
(Secretary-General of  
the Arab League)

- + Present at first session of Conference only.
- 6 Present at second session of Conference only.
- 7 Present at both sessions of Conference but as a delegate only at the second.
- 8 Present as a delegate of the Yemen at the first session and of Transjordan at the second session of the Conference.

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(c) Jewish Agency Delegation (at the informal  
meetings held outside the Official Conference)

Mr. David Ben Gurien	}	Palestine
Mr. Moshe Shertek		
Mr. A. Horowitz		
Mr. A.S. Eban		
Mr. I. Gruenbaum		
Mr. T. Kellek		
Mr. Y. Heydt	}	Great Britain
Mr. Berl Locker		
Professor Selig Brodetaky		
Mr. J. Linten		
Mr. Nahum Goldman	}	United States
Mr. E. Neumann		

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## APPENDIX II

### ALLOCATION OF DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

<u>Item</u>	<u>Departments Responsible</u>
1. Invitation to Delegates	Foreign Office and Colonial Office
2. Meeting on Arrival	Foreign Office and Colonial Office
3. Hotel and other residential accommodation	Foreign Office
4. Transport (including distribution of papers)	Foreign Office, by arrangement with Ministry of Supply Car Pool.
5. Government Hospitality	Foreign Office and Colonial Office in consultation with Government Hospitality Fund.
6. <u>Langcaster House, St. James's Palace and 1. Carlton Gardens</u>	
(a) Preparation and equipment including telephones, typewriters, presses, etc.	Foreign Office
(b) Allocation of rooms	Cabinet Office
(c) Buffet and canteen	Government Hospitality Fund.
7. Staff	
Secretariat	Jointly by Cabinet Office, Foreign Office and Colonial Office.
Press Officer	Colonial Office
Interpreter	Colonial Office
Social Secretary	Foreign Office
8. Stationery	Cabinet Office
9. Security	Colonial Office
10. Passes	
For delegates and officials	Cabinet Office
For Press	Colonial Office
11. Secret "who's who" of delegates	Foreign Office and Colonial Office.

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APPENDIX III

SECRETARIAT AND STAFF OF THE CONFERENCE

Secretary: Mr. E.A. Armstrong, C.B.E., Cabinet Office

Assistant Mr. G.W. Furlonge, O.B.E., Foreign Office (for first session of the Conference)  
Secretaries: Mr. C.A. Gault, Foreign Office (for second session of the Conference)

Mr. W.A.C. Mathieson, M.B.E.

Social Secretary: Mr. S. Naish

Interpreter: Mr. J. Somerville, Palestine Administration (for first session of the Conference)

Higher Clerical

Officer: Mr. J.W. Mitchell, M.B.E., Cabinet Office.

3 Clerical Officers provided by Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Cabinet Office respectively

3 Shorthand Writers provided by Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Cabinet Office respectively.

2 Copying Typists

1 Duplicator Operator

Press Officers: Mr. A.J.H. Haler and Mr. J.W. Miller, Colonial Office.

Transport Officer: Mr. A.E. Gardner, Ministry of Supply.

8 Messengers provided by Foreign Office Conference Department.

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3149 Wt. 26469/137 100m 9/46 (51) F.&S. NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN.

Registry  
No. E1779/2/31

Top Secret.  
Secret.  
Confidential.  
Restricted.  
Open.

Draft. letter to

Mr E.A. Armstrong

C.B.E.

Cabinet Office

from C. H. H. H.

OUT FILE

+OC

10  
13 hands

10b

Dear Armstrong.

Thank you for your  
letter of February 26 about your  
most valuable &  
exhaustive note on the procedure  
shown in organising the Palestine  
Conference.

I have only two  
additions to suggest - to the list  
of delegates. One is Dr DAMLOSI  
who I believe was one of the  
Pineis hagg delegates at the  
first session and the other  
is Yassin M. Mohamed Mustafa  
YASSIN who was Secretary to the  
Egyptian Delegation at the second  
session & whose name appeared

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with those of the Egyptian  
delegates <sup>on</sup> all our records of  
proceedings.

Otherwise I have nothing  
to say.

I agree that the final  
version of ~~the~~ your Note might  
be given a limited circulation  
as you suggest. Could the  
P.O. have four copies besides  
any personal ones you send  
round?

Chm  
-6/3

Yours sincerely

(Sgd.) C. A. Sautt.

107

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.

13th March, 1947.

(E 1779/2/31)

Restricted.

Dear Armstrong,

Thank you for your letter of the 25th February about your most valuable and exhaustive note on the procedure followed in organising the Palestine Conference.

I have only two additions to suggest to the list of delegates. One is Dr. Damluji who I believe was one of the junior Iraqi delegates at the first session and the other is Monsieur Mohamed Mustafa Yassin who was Secretary to the Egyptian Delegation at the second session and whose names appeared with those of the Egyptian delegates on all our records of proceedings.

Otherwise I have nothing to say.

I agree that the final version of your Note might be given a limited circulation as you suggest. Could the Foreign Office have four copies besides any personal ones you send round.

Yours sincerely

(Sgd.) (C.A. Gault)

E.A. Armstrong, Esq., C.B.E.,  
Cabinet Offices.

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PALESTINE CONFERENCE 1946/47

## General

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When the Conference resumed after the adjournment, it was decided that it should meet in St. James's Palace, Lancaster House having been allocated for meetings of the Deputy Foreign Ministers. St. James's Palace was much less suitable than Lancaster House in many ways. There were indeed spacious Conference Rooms, but the accommodation for the Secretariat and other staff was so unsatisfactory that it was decided to take over part of the ground floor of 3, Cleveland Row, occupied by the Foreign Office Claims Department, for the Secretariat. The Press Section was, however, accommodated in St. James's Palace. Another serious drawback of the Palace was the difficulty of keeping the rooms warm during the very severe weather which prevailed during the whole of the second session of the Conference, and only one meeting was in fact held there. All other meetings took place in the large reception room at the Foreign Secretary's residence at 1, Carlton Gardens.

5. Details of the Secretariat and staff of the Conference are shown in Appendix III. The composition and numbers were based on the experience of the Palestine Conference of 1939 and were adequate for all purposes. The Secretariat were much assisted by the fact that the Foreign Office and Colonial Office had selected two senior officials, Mr. Beeley and Sir Douglas Harris, for full-time special duty in connection with the Conference.



### Conference Committee

6. During its first session, the Conference appointed a Committee under the Chairmanship of Sir Norman Brook to elucidate alternative proposals put forward by the Arab Delegations. This Committee had five meetings. It was the only Committee set up by the Conference, although it is likely that if the Arabs had shown a less uncompromising attitude towards the final British proposals, the detailed examination of these proposals might have been undertaken by other Conference Committees.

### Conference Procedure

7. The following arrangements were agreed after preliminary consultations between the Secretariat and representatives of the Arab Delegations before the Conference began:-

#### (a) Language and Interpreters

English and Arabic were recognised languages for the purpose of the Conference. In practice all the Arab Delegates, except a very small number belonging to the Saudi Arabian and Yemeni Delegations, understood English and spoke in English. During the first session of the Conference a British official interpreter was available and he translated Arabic speeches into English and the more important statements in English for which a translation was desired, into Arabic. In the light of the experience gained during the first session of the Conference, and by agreement with the Arab Delegates, no official interpreter was made available for the second session. The Yemeni delegates were the only Arabs present during the second session who were unable to speak English and such translations as they required, were made by their own interpreter. All written records and notices were circulated in English.

#### (b) Records of Meetings

The Secretariat prepared full summaries of discussions and circulated them to the Delegates for their concurrence. Verbatim texts of the more important set speeches made by Delegates were reproduced in the minutes. Delegates were requested to send any amendments to draft minutes to the Secretariat not later than 24 hours after the receipt of a record of a meeting and the records, as amended, formed the only authoritative record of the proceedings. In practice the number of amendments made was small. The Arab Delegates did not object to, and indeed welcomed, the editing of their statements by the Secretariat. For speed of reproduction, the Secretariat adopted the practice of sharing the business of note-taking; after taking notes for half an hour or three-quarters of an hour the Secretary concerned would leave the Conference and dictate his notes - his place being taken by another Secretary. This arrangement worked well in practice, and it was always possible to circulate the minutes of a meeting by the first circulation on the day following.

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(d) Seating Arrangements

Advisory Committee to the British Delegation

-4-







### Security and Passes

10. Responsibility for the safety of individual Arab Delegates at all times was undertaken by the Special Branch, Scotland Yard, under the direction of Inspector Holmes. Plain clothes officers from Scotland Yard were on duty outside the Conference Room at all meetings. In view of the disturbed state of Palestine and the frequent acts of violence perpetrated by Jewish terrorists both in and outside of Palestine during the sessions of the Conference, security was a matter of vital importance and special vigilance was necessary.

Passes for Delegates and Officials were issued by the Secretary, and for press representatives by the Colonial Office. Copies of lists of pass-holders were given to Scotland Yard. On the resumption of the Conference after the adjournment the original passes were replaced by fresh passes.

### Hospitality

11. Responsibility for entertaining the Arab Delegates was undertaken by the Government Hospitality Fund under the direction of Brigadier Greenfield. His Majesty's Government gave two receptions (at Lancaster House and 1 Carlton Gardens) and one dinner (at Admiralty House) in honour of the Arab Delegates. Before the dinner the guests attended a private showing in the Admiralty Cinema of a film, which had just been released, entitled "Theirs is the Glory", and depicting the battle of Arnhem. A further means of showing hospitality to the Arabs was afforded by a buffet providing tea, coffee, non-alcoholic drinks, cakes, fruit etc., which was opened whenever possible after meetings of the Conference and Conference Committee. This buffet was very popular and gave Delegates and Officials an opportunity for useful informal discussion. The buffet (and the Canteen referred to below) was operated by NAAFI, who agreed to make the necessary arrangements after the Government Hospitality Fund had approached a number of catering firms without success. The services of NAAFI were only obtained after a high-level approach to the War Office. The arrangements they made were excellent although it was seldom possible to give them more than a few hours' notice of requirements and numbers, and, during the later session of the Conference the Canteen was at Lancaster House and the buffet either at St. James's Palace or at 1, Carlton Gardens. All difficulties were willingly faced and successfully surmounted.

12. In addition to the more formal hospitality described above, entertainment was provided privately to individual Arab Delegates and officials by British Officials who were authorised to claim reimbursement of expenditure approved for this purpose.

13. The return hospitality offered by the Arabs was generous and cordial. Every Delegation (except the Palestine Arabs) held one or more receptions and most gave luncheons or dinners as well. Some of these functions were interfered with by the strike of hotel employees in October, 1946.

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20. As mentioned in paragraph 2 above, the Jews did not participate formally in the Conference, although the Foreign and Colonial Secretaries had meetings with representative Jews from time to time. These meetings, which were held in the Colonial Office, were convened by the Colonial Office, but as a matter of convenience the Secretariat of the Conference made records of the meetings with the Delegation from the Jewish Agency. These records were not circulated to the Jews, who kept their own record of the proceedings.

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(a) British Delegation:

The Rt. Hon. Ernest Bevin, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

The Rt. Hon. George Hall, M.P.<sup>+</sup>, (Later Lord Hall)  
Secretary of State for the Colonies

The Rt. Hon. A. Creech Jones, M.P.,  
Secretary of State for the Colonies

Sir Norman Brook,  
Secretary of the Cabinet.

(b) Arab Delegations:

Egypt:

Abdel Razzak Ahmed<sup>+</sup>  
el Sanhoury Pasha

Ahmed Amin Bey<sup>+</sup>  
Me Fathi el Akkad<sup>+</sup>  
Me Abdul Moneim Mostafa  
Abdel Fattah Amr Pasha  
Abdel Rahman Hakki Bey  
Mohamed Mustafa Yassin

Iraq:

Dr. Fadhil Jamali<sup>7</sup>  
Mr. Arkhan Abadi<sup>7</sup>  
Mr. Bashaian<sup>0</sup>  
Dr. Faisal Damluji<sup>+</sup>

Lebanon:

Camille Bey Chamoun  
M. Victor Khoury  
M. Nadim Dimechkie

Palestine:

Jamal Bey Hussein  
Dr. Hussein Khalidi  
Emile Effendi Ghoury  
Sami Effendi Taher  
Dr. Omar al Khalil  
Yusuf Effendi Sahyoun

Saudi Arabia:

H.R.H. Amir Faisal<sup>+</sup>  
Sheikh Hafiz Wahba

Syria:

Faris Bey Khouri  
Amir Adil Arslan  
Dr. Najib Armenazi

- + Present at first session of Conference only.
- o Present at second session of Conference only.
- ≠ Present at both sessions of Conference but as a delegate only at the second.



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Transjordan:

Samir Pasha Rifai<sup>+</sup>  
H.H. Abdul Majid Haidar<sup>o</sup>  
Hani Bey Hashim<sup>o</sup>  
Dr. Fawzi Bey Mulki<sup>@</sup>

Yemen:

H.R.H. Seif-al-Islam Abdullah  
Dr. Fawzi Bey Mulki<sup>@</sup>  
El Sayid Hassan Ali Ibrahim  
Dr. Adnan Tarcici<sup>o</sup>

Arab League

Abdur Rahman Azzam Pasha<sup>+</sup>  
(Secretary-General of  
the Arab League)

(c) Jewish Agency Delegation (at the informal  
meetings held outside the Official Conference)

Mr. David Ben Gurion }  
Mr. Moshe Shertok }  
Mr. A. Horowitz } Palestine  
Mr. A.S. Eban }  
Mr. I. Gruenbaum }  
Mr. T. Kollek }

Mr. Y. Heydt }  
Mr. Berl Locker } Great Britain  
Professor Selig Brodetsky }

Mr. Nahum Goldman } United  
Mr. E. Neumann } States

- \* Present at first session of Conference only  
o Present at second session of Conference only.  
x Present at both sessions of Conference but  
as a delegate only at the second.  
@ Present as a delegate of the Yemen  
at the first session and of Transjordan  
at the second session of the Conference.

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APPENDIX II

ALLOCATION OF DEPARTMENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

<u>Item</u>	<u>Departments Responsible</u>
1. Invitation to Delegates	Foreign Office and Colonial Office
2. Meeting on Arrival	Foreign Office and Colonial Office
3. Hotel and other residential accommodation	Foreign Office
4. Transport (including distribution of papers)	Foreign Office, by arrangement with Ministry of Supply Car Pool.
5. Government Hospitality	Foreign Office and Colonial Office in consultation with Government Hospitality Fund.
6. <u>Lancaster House,</u> <u>St. James's Palace and</u> <u>1, Carlton Gardens</u>	
(a) Preparation and equipment including telephones, typewriters, presses, etc.	Foreign Office
(b) Allocation of rooms	Cabinet Office
(c) Buffet and canteen	Government Hospitality Fund.
7. <u>Staff</u>	
Secretariat	Jointly by Cabinet Office, Foreign Office and Colonial Office.
Press Officer	Colonial Office
Interpreter	" "
Social Secretary	Foreign Office
8. Stationery	Cabinet Office
9. Security	Colonial Office
10. <u>Passes</u>	
For delegates and officials	Cabinet Office
For Press	Colonial Office
11. Secret "Who's Who" of Delegates	Foreign Office and Colonial Office.

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Secretary: Mr. E.A. Armstrong, C.B.E., Cabinet Office

Assistant Secretaries: Mr. G.W. Furlonge, O.B.E., Foreign Office (for first session of the Conference)

Mr. C.A. Gault, Foreign Office (for second session of the Conference)

Mr. W.A.C. Mathieson, M.B.E. Colonial Office.

Interpreter: Mr. J. Somerville, Palestine Administration  
(for first session of the Conference)

3 Clerical Officers provided by Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Cabinet Office respectively.

3 Shorthand Typists provided by Foreign Office, Colonial Office and Cabinet Office respectively.

2 Copying Typists

## 1 Duplicator Operator

Press Officers: Mr. A.J.H. Haler and Mr. J.W. Miller,  
Colonial Office.

Transport Officer: Mr. A.E. Gardner, Ministry of Supply.

8 Messengers provided by Foreign Office Conference Department.

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63

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E 1886

4 MAR

1947

PALESTINE

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 1886/2/31

Mr Grafton Smith

Judda

to Mr Dixon

18 Feb 1947

4 Mar 1947

Palestine Conference.Expresses personal thanks for Mr Dixon's  
constructively objective approach to a  
traditionally controversial subject.

Last Paper.

1479

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

Exp. by Grafton  
Smith

from Mr Dixon

Feb 24

(Action  
completed.)

L.M. 14/3

(Index.)

R.M.  
5/6/48

Next Paper.

E 1918

(Minutes.)

H.B. Bailey 4/3

R.P.  
- m.m.

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SJS.

BRITISH LEGATION,  
JEDDA,  
SAUDI ARABIA.

E 1886

February 18. 1947. 122

4 MAR

Personal.

1) Sir R. Howe R. 6.3.

2) Eastern Dept to see.

My dear Secretary of State,

I have just been reading the minutes of your meetings with the Arab delegations & the Palestine Conference, and also the telegram in which you record the final meeting of Arab Conference; and I should like, if I may do so without impertinence, to express to you my personal thanks for your consistently objective approach to a traditionally controversial subject. You will realise how intimately the work of Am. Missions in this part of the world is affected, and how easily it is bedevilled, by Am. policy in Palestine. All of us at this Legation are

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 1917  
 4 - MAR 1917

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most grateful for the fairness  
 and infinite patience of your  
 approach to this problem; and  
 that must excuse this somewhat  
 irregular outburst.

Yours sincerely  
 Lawrence B. Grattapkin

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OUT FILE

FOREIGN OFFICE, S.W.1.,

24th February, 1947.

The Secretary of State  
asks me to thank you for  
your manuscript letter of  
February 18th and to tell  
you how pleased he was that  
you wrote to him about the  
Palestine Conference.

(32) P. L. DIXON

L.B. Grafftey-Smith, Esq.,  
C.M.G., O.B.E.

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1947

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PALESTINE

E 1918

5 MAR

125

Registry  
Number

FROM

No.

Dated

Received  
in Registry

E 1918/2/31

E.A. Armstrong

Cabinet Office

to Mr Gault

3 Mar 1947

5 Mar 1947

Palestine Conference.

Encloses copy of letter received from  
AZIZ AM PASHA, also copy of his reply.  
AZIZ AM PASHA, thanks Mr Armstrong  
for copies of documents relating to the  
Conference, and thanks both him and  
his colleagues for valuable assistance  
rendered to Arab Delegation.

Last Paper.

1886

References.

(Print.)

(How disposed of.)

(Minutes.)

H. Beely 5/3

R.A.  
5/3(Action  
completed.)

G.E.M. 6/3

(Index)

H.A. 6/6

Next Paper.

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Reference:

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entw. can  
OFFICES OF THE CABINET AND  
MINISTER OF DEFENCE,

GREAT GEORGE STREET,  
S.W.1.

3rd March, 1947

E 1918 16

Dear Gault,

You will be interested to see the  
enclosed copy of a letter which I have  
received from Azzam Pasha. I enclose also  
a copy of the reply which I have sent.

Yours sincerely,

*Ed. Armstrong*

C.A. Gault, Esq.,  
Foreign Office.

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COPY

LEAGUE OF ARAB STATES

Secretariat

Cairo, 24th February, 1947

Ref.: 60/1/11

Dear Mr. Armstrong,

Thanks very much for the documents relating to the Conference you have so kindly taken the trouble to send. Although the Conference has unfortunately failed to achieve the desired results, I can assure you that the impression it made on the Arab representatives in general was excellent, and they are all appreciative of the valuable assistance rendered them by your goodself and your colleagues, for which I am personally also grateful.

With kind regards,

Yours sincerely,

(Signed) A.R. AZZAM

E.A. Armstrong, Esq.,  
Secretary of the Palestine Conference,  
St. James's Palace,  
LONDON, S.W.1.

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Eni

I should like to thank you on behalf of my colleagues and myself for your very kind message of 24th February. I can assure you that our association with the Arab representatives at the Palestine Conference gave us all the greatest pleasure and we shall always retain happy recollections of the friendly relations which existed between us.

With kind regards,

Sqd. E. A. Armstrong

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